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Abstract 
Outcome knowledge influences recall of earlier predictions of an event. Compared to 
younger adults, older adults are more susceptible to the two underlying bias processes 
that contribute to this hindsight bias (HB) phenomenon, recollection bias and 
reconstruction bias. However, the role of cognitive abilities in these processes remains 
unclear. In Experiment 1, we extended the multinomial processing tree model for HB by 
incorporating individual variation in cognitive abilities into parameter estimation in a 
sample of 60 older (M = 72.50, range = 65 to 87) and 62 younger (M = 20.10, range = 18 
to 25) adults. In older adults, our findings revealed that (1) higher episodic memory was 
associated with higher recollection ability in the absence of outcome knowledge, (2) 
higher episodic memory, inhibitory control, and working memory capacity were 
associated with higher recollection ability in the presence of outcome knowledge, and (3) 
higher inhibitory control was associated with less reconstruction bias. Although the 
pattern of effects was similar in younger adults, the cognitive covariates did not 
significantly predict the underlying processes in this age group.  
In Experiment 2, we collected memory judgment HB data on an additional 80 older 
adults (M = 71.40, range = 65 to 87) to assess whether a) experimentally increasing 
inhibition demands via outcome rehearsal during the HB task impacts the underlying HB 
processes, and b) the effects of this cognitive load manipulation on the underlying HB 
processes vary with an individuals’ inherent cognitive abilities. Our findings revealed that 
cognitive load increased recollection bias independently of individuals’ cognitive abilities. 
Conversely, cognitive load only increased reconstruction bias in individuals with high 
inhibitory control, resulting in these individuals performing similarly to individuals with low 
inhibitory control. Our findings support the role of inhibitory control in older adults’ 
recollection and reconstruction biases, and suggest that even high functioning 
individuals are susceptible to HB when available processing resources are limited. 
Keywords:  Hindsight bias; multinomial processing tree; inhibitory control; older adults 
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Glossary 
Hindsight Bias After learning an event’s outcome, the inclination to view the 
event as being predictable or inevitable (the “I knew-it-all-along” 
effect). Hindsight bias is often measured as the shift in the post-
outcome prediction towards the actual outcome relative to the 
pre-outcome prediction.  
Multinomial 
Processing  
Tree Model 
Data-analysis tool used to disentangle and measure the relative 
contributions of the unobservable cognitive processes that lead 
to a particular outcome. 
 
Akaike Information 
Criterion 
A measure used in model selection analyses to quantify the 
relative quality of a model for a given dataset. Akaike information 
criterion balances goodness-of-fit and model parsimony, and 
estimates the relative information loss when the given model is 
used to estimate the underlying processes that generate the 
data.  
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
A survey conducted in the Business Weekly revealed that few people predicted 
the severity of the Great Recession of 2008; however, in the depths of the recession, 
many people believed they saw warning signs (http://seekingalpha.com/article/58150-
business-week-2008-forecasters-expect-further-gains). We tend to overestimate our 
ability to forecast the future and, in hindsight, we often recall our prior predictions as 
being more accurate than they really were. Older adults are particularly vulnerable to this 
hindsight bias (HB) phenomenon. For example, when making prospective investment 
decisions, older adults have more difficulty ignoring previous outcomes and may fail to 
consider future investment data (e.g., Guiso & Paiella, 1999; Travor, 2013). 
Consequently, older adults tend to make riskier and often adverse investment decisions 
relative to younger adults. While the overconfidence that results from HB has a powerful 
and potentially negative impact on investment decisions, the implications of HB extend 
to other real-world judgments and professional decision making, such as those made in 
the legal, medical, political, and sporting realms (e.g., Arkes, Wortman, Saville, & 
Harkness, 1981; Harley, 2007; Leary, 1981). 
Neglecting to consider reasons for why an outcome occurred may result in a 
failure to learn from negative outcomes and overconfidence in future decision-making 
(see Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007). Given literature suggesting age-related declines in 
deliberate decision-making processes (Peters, Hess, Vastfjall, & Auman, 2007), older 
adults may be particularly vulnerable to decision-making errors that stem from HB. 
However, HB has been relatively unexplored within the context of aging, with only a 
handful of studies to date (Bayen, Erdfelder, Bearden, & Lozito, 2006; Bernstein et al., 
2011a; Coolin, Bernstein, Thornton, & Thornton, 2014; Groβ & Bayen, 2014). Given the 
aging population and the implications of HB for practical and professional decision-
making, understanding older adults’ susceptibility to HB and how HB impacts 
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independent decision-making will be critical to the development of tools to facilitate 
decision-making in older adults. 
In the existing aging literature, researchers have assessed HB using a memory 
judgment task (Hell et al., 1988), which involves participants providing original judgments 
(OJ) to trivia questions (e.g., “How long is the Nile River?”). Later, they learn the correct 
answers (referred to as correct judgments or CJ) to half of the questions (experimental 
items), but not the other half (control items), and then recall their original judgments 
(ROJ) to all the questions. A HB response is characterized by the ROJ typically being 
closer to the CJ for experimental than for control items (for a review of HB measures, 
see Pohl, 2007). For example, a typical HB response would be as follows: An individual 
originally estimates that the Rhine River is 500 kilometers long (OJ), and then after 
learning that it is actually 1,320 kilometers long (CJ), he or she recalls originally 
estimating that it was 1,000 kilometers long (ROJ). Across studies, older adults 
demonstrated a greater tendency to exhibit HB as compared to younger adults (Bayen et 
al., 2006; Bernstein et al., 2011a; Coolin et al., 2014; Groβ & Bayen, 2014).   
One explanation for increased HB in older adults is that declines in episodic 
memory and executive functioning may influence susceptibility to outcome knowledge 
when making hindsight judgments (e.g., Bayen, Pohl, Erdfelder, & Auer, 2007; Coolin et 
al., 2014). Indeed, we previously found that older adults’ susceptibility to HB was partly 
due to age-related declines in episodic memory and inhibition (Coolin et al., 2014). For 
example, age-related declines in episodic memory (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004) may have 
resulted in outcome knowledge interfering with older adults’ recollection of the OJ, 
creating a recollection bias: higher recollection of the OJ for control than for experimental 
items. If the OJ is not recollected, then it must be reconstructed. During this 
reconstruction stage, age-related declines in inhibition (Hasher & Zacks, 1988) may 
have resulted in older adults being unable to suppress the CJ. Subsequently, this 
information may bias the reconstruction of the forgotten OJ, creating a reconstruction 
bias: a shift of the ROJ towards the CJ relative to the OJ.   
While researchers have demonstrated a link between cognitive abilities and 
overall HB (e.g., Bayen et al., 2006, 2007; Coolin et al., 2014; Groβ & Bayen, 2014), it is 
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less clear which precise cognitive abilities are important in the underlying recollection 
and reconstruction processes. Thus the objectives of this dissertation are threefold: (1) 
to identify the cognitive traits associated with the underlying recollection and 
reconstruction processes in older and younger adults, (2) to experimentally manipulate 
cognitive load to provide empirical support for the role of cognitive functioning in the 
underlying HB processes, and (3) to present a novel approach to incorporating 
heterogeneity in cognitive abilities into the estimation of the core parameters of the 
multinomial processing tree (MPT) model of HB. This third objective provided a 
methodological outlet to address the first two objectives. In Experiment 1, we outline our 
novel methodology and then apply it to an older and younger adult dataset to address 
the first objective. In Experiment 2 we use a new dataset to address the second 
objective and empirically test the model findings from Experiment 1.  
1.1. Multinomial Processing Tree (MPT) Modeling 
Erdfelder and Buchner (1998) developed a multinomial processing tree (MPT) 
model for memory judgment data to estimate the relative contributions of recollection 
and reconstruction biases to HB (for reviews of MPT models see Batchelder & Riefer, 
1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009). The model has 13 parameters and thus is referred to as 
the HB13 model. Table 1.1 outlines the psychological interpretation of the HB13 model 
parameters. Each parameter represents a different psychological process that together 
form the underlying processing tree, which describes the multiple ways in which HB 
arises. The biases and errors that can occur in each judgment stage are captured by 
parameters rC, rE, b, and c – the four core parameters of the HB13 model. The remaining 
eight parameters are ancillary parameters. Parameters rC and rE represent the 
probabilities of recalling the OJ for control and experimental items, respectively. 
Recollection bias is the difference between the recollection probabilities (i.e., rC – rE). 
Parameters b and c are reconstruction parameters. Parameter b is the probability of 
reconstruction bias, which occurs when outcome knowledge influences the 
reconstruction of a forgotten OJ. Parameter c is the probability of a verbatim CJ 
adoption. Thus, whereas reconstruction bias is represented by a shift of the ROJ toward 
the CJ relative to the OJ (e.g., OJ = 500; CJ = 1,320; ROJ = 1,000; OJ < ROJ < CJ), a 
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CJ adoption is represented by a complete match of the ROJ and CJ (e.g., OJ = 500; CJ 
= 1,320; ROJ = 1,320; OJ < ROJ = CJ), an error that is relatively infrequent in adults 
(e.g., Bayen et al., 2006). The two prior studies that have used the HB13 model to 
investigate age differences in HB have shown that older adults tend to have a larger 
reconstruction bias and recollection bias than do younger adults (Bayen et al., 2006; 
Bernstein et al., 2011a). With regard to parameter c, older adults tend to show more CJ 
adoptions, particularly when the CJ is accessible during ROJ (Bayen et al., 2006).   
 
Table 1.1.     HB13 Model Parameters and their Psychological Interpretations 
Parameter Interpretation 
rCk Probability of an individual recalling the OJ for a control item. 
rEk Probability of an individual recalling the OJ for an experimental item. 
bk Probability of an individual making a biased reconstruction given a failure 
to recall their OJ. 
c Probability of a CJ adoption in the case of biased reconstructions. 
h Probability of a chance hit of the OJ or CJ in the case of unbiased 
reconstructions. 
g
11
, g
g1
 Parameters characterizing the ROJ distribution in the case of unbiased 
reconstructions without chance hits (for OJ < CJ and OJ > CJ, 
respectively). 
g
12
, g
g2
 Parameters characterizing the ROJ distribution in the case of unbiased 
reconstructions without chance hits (for OJ < CJ and OJ > CJ, 
respectively). 
g
13
, g
g3
 Parameters characterizing the ROJ distribution in the case of biased 
reconstructions without a CJ adoption (for OJ < CJ and OJ > CJ, 
respectively). 
l
C, lE Probability of OJ < CJ for control and experimental items, respectively. 
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A limitation of previous HB13 model applications is their assumption of fixed 
process contributions across individuals. When data are aggregated the model provides 
a single set of 13 parameters for the entire sample and thus cannot account for 
individual differences. The underlying parameter homogeneity assumption may easily be 
violated, especially when modeling a cognitive phenomenon. Parameters quantify 
different cognitive aspects of task performance and people demonstrate variability in 
their cognitive skills, particularly in samples with large within-group differences (e.g., for 
older adults, see Smith & Batchelder, 2008). Ignoring this heterogeneity in analyses of 
aggregated data is also problematic from a statistical point of view, as parameter 
heterogeneity may distort results of parameter estimation and goodness-of-fit tests 
(Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009; Klauer, 2006, 2010; Smith & 
Batchelder, 2008; Stahl & Klauer, 2007). Furthermore, models that adequately describe 
the response structure at an individual level will often be rejected at the aggregate group 
level because the parameters vary across individuals (Stahl & Klauer, 2007).   
In response to these issues, researchers have developed formal approaches to 
incorporate individual variability into MPT models (e.g., Klauer, 2006, 2010; Smith & 
Batchelder, 2010). These approaches are based on hierarchical extensions of traditional 
MPT models and capture parameter heterogeneity by specifying a distribution of the 
parameters across individuals. For example, Klauer (2006) proposed a latent-class MPT 
model that is based on a discrete distribution of parameters. This approach assumes 
that each participant falls into one of a fixed set of mutually exclusive latent classes.  
Although the parameter values of all individuals in a certain latent class are assumed to 
be homogenous, the model allows for variation in parameter values between classes 
(Klauer, 2006). In a subsequent paper, Stahl and Klauer (2007) provided a computer 
program (HMMTree) to implement latent-class hierarchical MPT models.  
More recently, researchers have argued that the latent-class model’s assumption 
of a discrete distribution, in which participants are sampled from several distinct but 
homogenous groups, may be inadequate in certain applications and that a continuous 
distribution of parameter values across individuals is more reasonable (Smith & 
Batchelder, 2010). Therefore, Smith and Batchelder (2010) developed a class of 
hierarchical models that allows parameters to vary continuously over individuals. The 
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assumption is that each individual’s model parameters are sampled independently from 
a multivariate Beta distribution. Furthermore, Klauer (2010) proposed a latent-trait 
approach based on continuous latent variables with an underlying multivariate Gaussian 
structure. A major advantage of this model is that it can conceivably be extended to 
include covariates that explain variability in the model parameters.   
Although researchers have made considerable progress in implementing inter-
individual heterogeneity into the estimation of MPT models, these hierarchical models 
remain quite complex and statistically intensive. Furthermore, the models are limited by 
distributional assumptions for the parameters. That is, the validity of this family of models 
hinges on subscribing to a certain distributional assumption for the model parameters, 
which may not be warranted in all situations. To date, no one has attempted to apply any 
of these approaches to the HB13 multinomial model, and thus our understanding of the 
cognitive abilities that impact the processes underlying HB remains incomplete. In 
Experiment 1 we address this limitation by developing a novel approach to incorporating 
individual differences in cognitive abilities into parameter estimation of the HB13 
multinomial model to identify the role of cognitive abilities in the underlying HB 
processes. 
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Chapter 2. Experiment 1: Introduction 
We present a variation of Klauer’s (2010) latent-trait model that incorporates 
individual difference data (i.e., cognitive ability scores) into the HB13 multinomial model 
to explain variability in the underlying processes. Although we aimed to explain 
heterogeneity in terms of cognitive functioning data, our model can be generalized to 
include any continuous or categorical covariate (e.g., personality, demographic 
variables, etc.), and thus will have broad applications in the MPT and HB literatures. We 
were particularly interested in modeling HB in older adults because the large variation in 
cognitive functioning in this population permits us to examine whether individual 
differences in cognitive functioning could explain heterogeneity in the underlying HB 
processes. Although there is less variation in cognitive functioning in younger adults, we 
also applied our model to a younger adult comparison group to examine whether the 
general pattern of findings observed in older adults would also hold for this age group. 
We begin by briefly reviewing cognitive theories of HB, followed by our hypotheses 
regarding the cognitive abilities associated with the underlying processes and a 
description of our model.  
2.1. The Recollection-Reconstruction Theory of HB 
The HB13 model is based on a recollection-reconstruction theory of hindsight 
judgments, similar to two-stage memory judgment theories suggested for other 
paradigms (cf. Dehn & Erdfelder, 1998; Hell et al., 1988; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; 
Stahlberg & Maass, 1998). The model assumes that when prompted for a hindsight 
judgment, individuals first try to recollect their own OJ. For control items, in which 
outcome knowledge is absent, recollection of one’s OJ should depend on episodic 
memory functioning in the first place, such as the ability to successfully encode, 
consolidate, and retrieve the OJ from long-term memory. For experimental items, in 
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which outcome knowledge is present, recollection of one’s OJ may not only depend on 
memory functioning but also on the ability to inhibit outcome information. If this 
information is not inhibited, then it may interfere with the memory trace of the OJ, 
resulting in poorer recollection of the OJ for experimental than for control items (i.e., 
recollection bias). Conditional on a failed OJ recollection, individuals then enter a second 
judgment stage in which they try to reconstruct the OJ on the basis of available context 
information. In this reconstruction stage, over-reliance on outcome knowledge may result 
in a biased reconstruction of the OJ (i.e., reconstruction bias). 
 Reconstruction theories have received more attention than recollection theories, 
and researchers have developed several models to explain the mechanisms by which 
reconstruction bias can occur (see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, 
Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990, for reviews). Two popular 
reconstruction theories are the anchoring and adjustment theory and the rejudgment 
theory. The anchoring and adjustment theory posits that individuals reconstruct their OJ 
on the basis of their updated knowledge state (i.e., after learning the CJ), and then 
adjust this estimate to account for their naïve prior state (i.e., prior to learning the CJ). 
HB may result from an inadequate adjustment process. The rejudgment theory posits 
that individuals attempt to repeat the judgment process that they used to generate the 
OJ (Winman, Juslin & Bjӧrkman, 1998). In this case, HB may result if contextual 
information during the OJ stage differs from that of the ROJ stage, or if outcome 
knowledge alters (i.e., updates) one’s knowledge base. Prior work generally supports 
reconstruction theories of HB (Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998; Hoffrage, Hertwig, & 
Gigerenzer, 2000; Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003).  
Although reconstruction bias is a major determinant of HB, other theorists argue 
that recollection bias also plays a role (e.g., Erdfelder, Brandt, & Bröder, 2007; Nestler, 
Blank, & Egloff, 2010; Pohl, Bayen, & Martin, 2010). For example, in a review of 11 
studies across 34 conditions Erdfelder and colleagues (2007) found a small, but reliable 
mean recollection bias estimate of .03 (range -.05 to .22) in within-subject manipulations 
of experimental and control items. This indicates that, on average, participants 
successfully recalled 3% more of their OJs when they were not shown the CJs. The 
recollection bias was found to be larger in studies using randomized between-subjects 
manipulations of outcome knowledge. These findings are consistent with other reviews 
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(Pohl, 2004), suggesting that recollection bias is a modest but significant contributor to 
HB. Broader integrative theories of HB have also proposed that both recollection and 
reconstruction biases are implicated in HB and that outcome knowledge interferes with 
the recollection and reconstruction of OJs (Blank & Nestler, 2007; Hoffrage et al., 2000; 
Pohl, Eisenhauer, & Hardt, 2003). 
2.2. The Role of Cognitive Functioning in HB 
Cognitive abilities that have been implicated in age differences in HB include 
inhibition of irrelevant information, episodic memory, and working memory (e.g., Bayen 
et al., 2006, 2007; Coolin et al., 2014; Groβ & Bayen, 2014). We have previously 
reported that inhibition and episodic memory partially mediated age-related increases in 
HB in a sample of older and younger adults (Coolin et al., 2014). Specifically, older age 
was associated with lower inhibitory control and episodic memory, which were 
associated with a tendency to exhibit HB more often. In this experiment, we apply an 
extended version of the HB13 multinomial model to assess whether these cognitive 
abilities influenced recollection or reconstruction processes, or both.   
A potentially relevant theoretical framework is provided by the inhibitory-deficit 
theory (Hasher & Zacks 1988; Lustig, Hasher, & Zacks, 2007), which proposes three 
functions of inhibition: (1) controlling access of irrelevant information from entering 
working memory, (2) suppressing irrelevant information that has gained access to 
working memory, and (3) restraining strong but inappropriate responses. Each inhibitory 
function is less efficient in older compared to younger adults, and lower inhibitory 
functioning is associated with difficulty in other areas of cognitive functioning (e.g., 
episodic memory, processing speed, attention; Lustig et al., 2007). Researchers have 
suggested that several inhibitory functions may be involved in the memory judgment HB 
task (see Bayen et al., 2006, 2007). For example, access inhibition may be required to 
control access of irrelevant CJ information from entering working memory and interfering 
with recall of task-relevant OJ information. Given a failure in access control, the 
suppression function may be needed to suppress CJ information that has already gained 
access to working memory. Finally, restraint inhibition may be required to avoid 
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responding using the highly accessible CJ information. Thus, lower inhibitory functioning 
may result in the CJ interfering with recall of the OJ (i.e., recollection bias), and/or 
biasing the reconstruction of a forgotten OJ (i.e., reconstruction bias).  
Erdfelder and colleagues (2007) found support for the role of inhibition in 
recollection bias in a sample of younger adults. The authors separated inhibition into two 
types of interference effects referred to as specific and generalized response 
competition (see Newton & Wickens, 1956). They defined specific response competition 
as new knowledge impairing memory for prior knowledge for a specific item (e.g., 
learning the length of the Nile River interferes with memory for one’s OJ to this item), 
and generalized response competition as new knowledge interfering with memory for a 
set of items (i.e., learning the length of the Nile River interferes with the recall of the OJs 
to several other items -- for example, “How long is the Rhine River?”). Erdfelder and 
colleagues demonstrated that both interference effects contribute to recollection bias 
and can be selectively manipulated. Whereas generalized recollection bias increased 
with the number (i.e., set size) and similarity (i.e., related knowledge domains) of items, 
specific recollection bias decreased when the encoding and retrieval contexts of 
experimental items were similar (i.e., enhanced ROJ).   
Researchers have also hypothesized that episodic memory plays a role in the 
recollection stage (Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998; Hell et al., 1988). For example, according 
to the memory trace strength hypothesis, individuals with lower episodic memory may 
have weaker memory representations of their OJs, and thus be more susceptible to 
outcome knowledge interfering with retrieval of the OJ (Hell et al., 1988).  Furthermore, if 
the OJ cannot be retrieved, individuals may over-rely on the CJ during the reconstruction 
process (Hell et al., 1988; Pohl et al., 2003). Thus, lower recall ability could be 
associated with higher recollection bias or reconstruction bias.   
Finally, researchers have shown that accessibility of outcome knowledge in 
working memory affects HB (Bayen et al., 2006; Groβ & Bayen, 2014, but also see 
Nestler, Blank, & von Collani, 2008). Bayen and colleagues (2006) found that when the 
CJs appeared immediately prior to recall with an instruction for participants to memorize 
them for a later test (Exp. 2), older and younger adults showed higher overall HB than 
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when the CJs appeared minutes prior to recall with no encoding instructions (Exp. 3). 
MPT analyses revealed that both age groups demonstrated a significant reconstruction 
bias across experiments. In contrast, whereas younger adults did not show a recollection 
bias in either experiment, older adults demonstrated a significant recollection bias (but 
only in Exp. 2). One explanation may be that when outcome knowledge is available in 
working memory during recall, it decreases the ability to retrieve the OJ, possibly by 
creating interference between the OJ and CJ, resulting in a recollection bias. 
2.3. Hypotheses and Objectives 
We propose a variation of Klauer’s (2010) latent-trait model that incorporates 
cognitive covariates into the core parameter estimation process using a logistic link 
function. Using the proposed model (referred to as the logistic HB13 model) we 
examined whether heterogeneity in recollection ability and reconstruction bias in older 
and younger adults can be accounted for by various cognitive abilities previously 
implicated in HB (e.g., Bayen et al., 2006, 2007; Coolin et al., 2014; Erdfelder et al., 
2007). By observing individual bias parameters, we examined the relationship between 
the parameters and cognitive abilities using appropriate regression models. For 
example, if one modeled the person-specific parameter for reconstruction bias, denoted 
as bk, as a logistic function of inhibition, the function would be 
bk = 
exp⁡(∝+𝛽∙𝐼𝑛ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘)
(1+exp⁡(∝+𝛽∙𝐼𝑛ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘))
,                       (1) 
whereα and β are real-valued constants to be estimated and k represents an individual, 
k = 1, …, n. The rationale for this equation is that individuals with higher inhibitory control 
should have a lower reconstruction bias than would individuals with lower inhibitory 
control. As we describe later, higher scores on our inhibition measure reflect lower 
inhibitory control (i.e., increased latencies). Thus, we would expect β to be positive in 
this equation. If the β coefficient for the inhibition term were significant, one would reject 
the null hypothesis that bk does not vary as a function of inhibition. The logistic HB13 
model presented here allows us to estimate α and β in the above regression equation 
and test hypotheses about these parameters.   
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On the basis of prior work (Bayen et al., 2006, 2007; Coolin et al., 2014; 
Erdfelder et al., 2007) we investigated whether recollection ability and reconstruction 
bias vary as functions of individual differences in (1) inhibition, (2) episodic memory, and 
(3) working memory capacity. These particular cognitive abilities often show age-related 
decline in older adult samples, and larger inter-individual variability is apparent within 
older than younger samples (e.g., Christensen et al., 1994; Raz et al., 2010; Zelazo, 
Craig, & Booth, 2004). Such variability in cognition may contribute to differences in the 
underlying HB processes. We predicted that similar cognitive abilities would contribute to 
these processes across age groups; however, given the larger variability in cognitive 
functioning in older adults, we expected larger effects in older than in younger adults.   
Our working hypotheses were that rC would depend on memory functioning, such 
that higher episodic memory would be associated with a higher recollection rate for 
control items, and rE would depend on both episodic memory and inhibitory control, such 
that higher episodic memory and inhibitory control would be associated with a higher 
recollection rate for experimental items. Our working hypothesis for reconstruction bias 
(b) was that each of the three cognitive abilities examined would affect reconstruction 
bias. First, we expected individuals with lower inhibitory control to have more difficulty 
suppressing outcome knowledge. This information might then bias the reconstruction 
process. Second, we expected individuals with lower episodic memory to have weaker 
memory traces of their OJs, and thus to over-rely on the CJ to reconstruct forgotten OJs. 
Third, we expected individuals with lower working memory capacity to have more 
difficulty separating the multiple pieces of information in working memory during recall 
(e.g., OJ and CJ), and thus to be more likely to exhibit interference between the OJ and 
CJ during ROJ generation. 
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Chapter 3.  
Methods 
3.1. HB13 Model (Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998) 
Prior to detailing our proposed extension to the HB13 model, we will first review 
some of the basic considerations of Erdfelder and Buchner’s (1998) HB13 model. The 
model requires discrete data. Thus, participants’ continuous HB judgments on each item 
are assigned to one of 10 possible categories. The categories are a set of all possible 
rank orders of the OJ - CJ - ROJ, allowing for ties between the OJ and ROJ but 
excluding ties between the OJ and CJ because HB cannot be investigated when the OJ 
and CJ are identical (Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998). Five categories are created to 
encompass instances when the OJ underestimates the CJ-- (1) ROJ < OJ < CJ, (2) ROJ 
= OJ < CJ, (3) OJ < ROJ < CJ, (4) OJ < ROJ = CJ, and (5) OJ < CJ < ROJ-- and another 
five for instances when the OJ overestimates the CJ-- (6) CJ < OJ < ROJ, (7) CJ < ROJ 
= OJ, (8) CJ < ROJ < OJ, (9) ROJ = CJ < OJ, and (10) ROJ < CJ < OJ. The categories 
capture whether the ROJ deviates in the direction of the CJ (Rank orders 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 
10), in the opposite direction (Rank orders 1 and 6), or whether the ROJ is equal to the 
OJ (Rank orders 2 and 7). On the basis of the frequency of responses that fit into each 
category, the probabilities of the sequence of processes that lead to certain OJ - CJ - 
ROJ rank orders can be calculated to decompose the HB observed in memory judgment 
experiments. 
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3.1.1. Illustration of the HB13 Model 
Erdfelder and Buchner’s (1998) HB13 model contains 13 parameters (refer to 
Table 1.1) that together form the underlying processing trees that delineates the 
sequence of cognitive processes that lead to certain rank order categories, some of 
which are classified as a HB response (e.g., OJ < ROJ < CJ) and others which are not 
(e.g., ROJ = OJ < CJ; see Figure 3.1.1). Each node in the tree represents a point at 
which either the upper or lower branch is taken with a given probability. The processing 
tree in Figure 3.1.1A depicts the model for control items (C), in which the CJ is absent. 
The first branch identifies whether the OJ underestimates (l
C
) or overestimates (1 – l
C
) 
the CJ.1 The upper tree represents processes that occur when the OJ initially 
underestimates the CJ. If the OJ is successfully recalled, with probability r
C
, then the 
ROJ = OJ. However, if the OJ is not recalled, with probability (1 – r
C
), then a 
reconstruction is required. Because the CJ is absent for control items, the reconstruction 
process is unbiased, but could hit the OJ or CJ by chance, with probability 2h. In the 
case of an unbiased reconstruction without a chance hit, with probability (1 – 2h), 
parameters g
11
 and g
12 
denote the probabilities of the OJ underestimating the CJ (OJ < 
CJ). Specifically, if the reconstruction results in an ROJ that is smaller than the CJ (ROJ 
< CJ), with probability g
11
, then the ROJ will be smaller or larger than the OJ, with 
probabilities g
12
 and (1 - g
12
), respectively. In contrast, if the reconstruction results in an 
ROJ that is larger than the CJ (ROJ > CJ), with probability (1 - g
11
), then the ROJ will be 
larger than the OJ with probability 1. The lower tree (cases where OJ > CJ) corresponds 
to the upper tree described here. 
 
 
 
1
 Erdfelder and Buchner (1998) suggest that the size of the HB effect may differ depending on 
whether an individual’s OJ underestimates or overestimates the CJ during the encoding stage. 
Although the values of the model’s parameters (particularly unbiased reconstruction 
parameters) may depend on whether the OJ underestimates or overestimates the CJ, the 
sequence of cognitive processes that occur during the retrieval stage is assumed to be 
independent of events during encoding. 
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Figure 3.1.1.     Erdfelder and Buchner’s (1998) Multinomial Processing Tree Model 
for Hindsight Bias. A: Processing tree for control items. B: Processing tree for 
experimental items. OJ = Original Judgment; ROJ = Recall of the Original Judgment; CJ 
= Correct Judgment.  From “Decomposing the Hindsight Bias: A Multinomial Processing 
Tree Model for Separating Recollection and Reconstruction in Hindsight,” by E. Erdfelder 
and A. Buchner, 1998, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 24, pp. 392–393. Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association. 
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The processing tree in Figure 3.1.1B depicts the model for experimental items 
(E), in which the CJ is present. This model follows the same basic structure as the 
control model, with several notable differences. First, the probability of recalling the OJ 
for experimental items (r
E
) may differ from that of the control items, indicating a 
recollection bias (r
C 
- r
E
). If no recollection bias is present, then recollection of the OJ 
would be equal across item conditions (r
C
 = r
E
); however if outcome knowledge interferes 
with recollection ability during recall, then recollection of the OJ may be better for control 
compared to experimental items (r
C 
> r
E
). The second difference to note in the 
experimental model is that given a failure to recall the OJ, the reconstruction process 
can be biased by outcome knowledge, with probability b. One way in which a biased 
reconstruction can result is from a verbatim CJ adoption (c). If there is no CJ adoption, 
with probability (1 – c), a biased reconstruction can also occur if the ROJ falls between 
the OJ and CJ (OJ < ROJ < CJ or CJ < ROJ < OJ), with a probability of g
l3 
or g
g3
, or if 
the ROJ is larger or smaller than the CJ and OJ (OJ < CJ < ROJ or ROJ < CJ < OJ), 
with probability (1 - g
l3) and (1 – gg3). 
Model equations are derived by summing all the corresponding branch 
probabilities that lead to a particular rank order event, with the probability of a branch 
being a product of all parameters belonging to that branch. For example, in the control 
model, the probability of perfectly recalling an OJ when it is an underestimate of the CJ 
(i.e., ROJ = OJ < CJ) is derived from the product of the corresponding parameters (i.e., 
lC · rC). If more than one branch leads to the same rank order event, then the branch 
probabilities are summed. The remaining model equations can be found in Table 3 of 
Erdfelder and Buchner (1998, p. 396). Based on these 20 model equations (10 for 
control; 10 for experimental) the parameters are estimated by maximizing the model’s 
likelihood function, and the likelihood ratio G2 is typically used to test whether the model 
adequately fits the data (Hu & Batchelder, 1994). 
3.2. The Logistic HB13 Model: Model Derivation 
For ease of comparison, we adapt the notation used in Erdfelder and Buchner’s 
(1998) HB13 model. Let i denote the experimental or control item condition (i = 1, 2), j 
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denote the rank order (j = 1, ..., 10), and k denote the participant (k = 1, ... , n). Let 
represent the number of observations in condition i and rank order j for participant k and 
the corresponding probability for the same event category. The model parameters 
for individual k are summarized in a parameter vector θk, and the vector of individual 
characteristics (e.g., cognitive ability test scores) for participant k is denoted by Xk. In 
addition to the observed individual characteristics, the total number of HB rank order 
observations for condition i and participant k is .  We adapt Erdfelder and 
Buchner’s expression for the probability of observing a vector of sample frequencies to 
an individual level. For participant k in condition i, this probability follows a multinomial 
distribution as follows: 
.            (2) 
Apart from introducing separate multinomial distributions for each individual k, 
the main innovation in Eq. 2, as compared to Erdfelder and Buchner’s (1998, p. 390) Eq. 
1, is that pi,j,k is now not only a function of the parameter vector θk, but also of the 
individual characteristics Xk. Note that individual variability in Xk makes the category 
probabilities pi,j,k vary between participants, even if the parameter vector θk happens to 
be constant across individuals. Because of this model property, we can allow 
heterogeneity into the model with only a small increase in the number of to-be-estimated 
parameters. For notational ease, we gather the individual sample frequencies for 
condition i into a vector Yi = (Yi,1,1,…, Yi,10,1,…, Yi1,n,…,Yi,10,n), where n represents the 
number of participants. Similarly, we gather the individual characteristics into a sample 
vector denoted as X = (X1,…,Xn). By experimental design, there is independence across 
participants’ data; thus, the joint probability of observing all participants’ data in a given 
condition is 
.             (3) 
Like Erdfelder and Buchner, we assume independence between experimental 
and control observations. Thus, the probability of observing the entire sample is 
, where .              (4) 
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3.2.1. Mapping Individual Characteristics to HB Parameters 
 
In accordance with the HB13 model, we model the category probabilities as 
being the product of an underlying multinomial processing tree. However, to incorporate 
the cognitive data, we conceive the process parameters as being derived from 
underlying latent variables that may vary between individuals.  For example, we model 
reconstruction bias for item m for participant k if the latent variable 𝑏𝑘𝑚
∗ ⁡exceeds a 
threshold. More precisely, 
⁡𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑘𝑚
∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑘𝑚
∗ ≤ 0
                               (5) 
By implication, the probability of reconstruction bias for participant k is 𝑏𝑘 =
𝑝(𝑏𝑘𝑚
∗ > 0). We then need to model the relationship between the observed individual 
characteristics and the latent variables. To incorporate cognitive data, we follow Klauer 
(2010) and Ansari, Vanhuele, and Zemborain (2008, as cited in Klauer, 2010) by 
modeling the latent variable 𝑏𝑘𝑚
∗  as a function of the cognitive data and a random error 
component: 
 𝑏𝑘𝑚
∗ = 𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽𝑏1𝑋1𝑘 + 𝛽𝑏2𝑋2𝑘 +…+ 𝛽𝑏𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘𝑚,           (6)  
where αb and βbc, c = 1, …, C, are parameters to be estimated; Xck, c = 1, …, C, denotes 
the value of variable Xc for participant k, and 𝜀𝑘𝑚 is the random error of participant k on 
item m. Whereas Klauer (2010) modeled⁡𝜀𝑘𝑚 as being normally distributed, Ansari et al. 
(2008, as cited in Klauer, 2010) modeled⁡𝜀𝑘𝑚 as being logistically distributed. We adopt 
the logistic distribution for its simplicity, since it allows for an analytical solution for the 
data likelihood.2 However, we conducted additional analyses using a normally distributed 
error term. As we will show in Appendix A, the results for the normal error model proved 
to be very similar, providing converging evidence for the logistic error model.  
 
2
 Note that another major difference from Klauer’s (2010) latent-trait approach is that we make a 
distributional assumption about the latent error term only, whereas he makes an additional 
assumption about the joint distribution of the latent model parameters (i.e., the assumption of a 
multivariate normal distribution). 
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A bias will occur whenever 𝜀𝑘𝑚 > −𝛼 − 𝛽𝑏1𝑋1𝑘 − 𝛽𝑏2𝑋2𝑘 −…− 𝛽𝑏𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑘. Thus, 
the probability of reconstruction bias for participant k, bk, is the probability that this event 
occurs. Because 𝜀𝑘𝑚 is logistically distributed with expectation zero, this probability is  
𝑏𝑘 =
exp⁡(𝛼𝑏+𝛽𝑏1𝑋1𝑘+𝛽𝑏2𝑋2𝑘+⋯+𝛽𝑏𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑘)
1+exp⁡(𝛼𝑏+𝛽𝑏1𝑋1𝑘+𝛽𝑏2𝑋2𝑘+⋯+𝛽𝑏𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑘)
.                  (7) 
For parameters that are not modeled as functions of cognitive data, the logistic 
function simplifies to a constant, as in the aggregated HB13 model. Another possibility is 
to allow the probabilities to vary freely across individuals. In this case, the latent variable 
would be modeled as 𝑏𝑘𝑚
∗ = 𝛼𝑏𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘𝑚, and the probability of bias would be 
𝑏𝑘 =
exp⁡(𝛼𝑏𝑘)
1+exp⁡(𝛼𝑏𝑘)
. 
 Given that (a) a higher bk indicates a higher reconstruction bias and (b) higher 
episodic memory and working memory scores indicate better performance, we would 
expect the coefficients for episodic memory and working memory to be negative. 
Conversely, because higher scores on the inhibition measure indicate lower inhibitory 
control (i.e., increased latencies), we would expect the coefficient for inhibition in the 
function for bk to be positive. This would indicate that higher episodic memory, working 
memory capacity, and inhibitory control are associated with a lower reconstruction bias. 
Analogously, we would expect the coefficient for episodic memory in the corresponding 
logistic functions for rCk and rEk to be positive, and the effect of inhibition on rEk to be 
negative. This would indicate that higher episodic memory and inhibitory control, 
respectively, are associated with a higher recollection of one’s OJ. 
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3.3. Model-Based Data Analysis 
 The logistic model outlined in the previous section can only be used to test our 
primary hypotheses when it provides a good account of the empirical data. To check the 
empirical adequacy of this model, we compared it to a series of alternative models 
incorporating individual variability. More precisely, we introduce four candidate models: 
(1) the general multinomial model, (2) the unconstrained HB13 model, (3) the simplified 
HB13 model, and (4) the logistic HB13 model. Table 3.3 presents a summary of each of 
these models. In addition, to facilitate comparisons with previous research on age 
differences in HB, we also provide analyses based on the original HB13 model when it is 
applied to data aggregated across individuals (see Appendix B). To anticipate, we 
observed age differences in the core HB parameters that are quite similar to those 
obtained by prior work (Bayen et al., 2006; Bernstein et al., 2011a).  
 
Table 3.3.     Summary of the Various MPT Models  
Model Interpretation 
Number of  
Free Parameters 
General Multinomial Raw category frequencies (pi,j,k) 2 · 9 · n 
HB13 HB13 model with aggregated data (Erdfelder 
& Buchner, 1998) 
13 
Unconstrained HB13 HB13 model applied to n individual data sets. 
Parameters are rCk, rEk, bk, ..., k = 1,. . ., n 
13 · n 
Simplified HB13 HB13 model with core parameters bk, rCk, and 
rEk and ancillary parameters gl1k, and gg1k 
unconstrained, and c and remaining ancillary 
parameters constant 
5 · n + 8 
Logistic HB13 HB13 model with bk, rCk, and rEk constrained 
as (four-parametric) logistic functions of three 
individual-differences variables,gl1k, and gg1k 
unconstrained, and c and remaining ancillary 
parameters constant 
4 + 4 + 4 + 2 · n + 8 
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The general multinomial model was our reference model and represents the 2 · 
10 probabilities of the experimental and control HB data, respectively, for each of the n 
individuals within an age group without any restriction. In contrast, the unconstrained 
HB13 model assumes that the HB13 model holds for each individual and allows for 
unconstrained individual variability in each of its 13 parameters. We first assessed the fit 
of the unconstrained HB13 model to the probabilities of the observed HB data (i.e., the 
general multinomial model) for the n individuals in the respective age groups. Then we 
introduced the simplified HB13 model, which is a more parsimonious version of the 
unconstrained HB13 model with fewer parameters. More precisely, we conducted 
heterogeneity tests on each of the 13 parameters to determine whether any of the 
unconstrained parameters could be simplified to a constant. On the basis of the results 
of these heterogeneity tests, in the simplified HB13 model, homogenous parameters 
were modeled as constants and heterogeneous parameters were allowed to vary 
between individuals. Finally, we introduced the logistic HB13 model, which replaces the 
unconstrained core parameters bk, rCk, and rEk of the simplified HB13 model with logistic 
functions of the cognitive covariates, allowing us to test the role of the cognitive 
covariates in these parameters. We first applied the above series of model steps to our 
older adult dataset and then applied the same model steps to our younger adult 
comparison group. 
Prior to presenting tests of our substantive hypotheses, we present a model 
selection analysis to determine which of our four candidate models best approximates 
the “true” model underlying the data. One possibility was to examine which model 
provides the closest fit to the data, but this criterion did not take into account model 
complexity. Although complex models with many free parameters tend to be more 
flexible in fitting different sets of data, it is more desirable to select a model that balances 
model accuracy (i.e., adequately accounts for the data) and parsimony (i.e., using few 
parameters, Myung, 2000; Myung & Pit, 1997; Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004). The main 
reason for this is that the flexibility of complex models leads to a disadvantage in 
predicting future data due to the increased probability of sampling error influencing the 
parameter estimates (e.g., Klauer, Stahl, & Erdfelder, 2007). To overcome this problem, 
we chose the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) for model selection, 
because this criterion (1) penalizes non-parsimonious models, and thus balances 
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descriptive accuracy and parsimony, (2) assesses goodness-of-fit of the model for 
predicting future data from the model as fitted from the observed data, and (3) is 
commonly used for choosing between stochastic models of cognition (e.g., Ashby, 
Prinzmetal, Ivry, & Maddox, 1996; Burnham & Anderson, 2002; Klauer et al., 2007; 
Myung, 2000).   
For each of the candidate models Mq, q = 1, 2, …,Q, the AIC is defined as 
follows:  
AICq = -2·ln(Lq) + 2Pq,                           (8) 
where Lq is the maximized likelihood for candidate model q, and Pq is the number of 
parameters in candidate model q. As can be seen in Eq. 8, AIC penalizes for lack of 
simplicity of the model, such that AIC values increase with the number of model 
parameters. The AIC-best model is the candidate model that provides the best balance 
between goodness-of-fit and parsimony, and is identified by the lowest AIC value. 
Notably, choosing the model with the lowest AIC value is asymptotically equivalent to 
choosing the model with the smallest expected information loss (minimizing the 
Kullback-Leibler discrepancy) when approximating a true model (Wagenmakers & 
Farrell, 2004). This is a highly desirable property of our model selection criterion. 
However, it does not provide a simple interpretation of raw AIC scores. 
           Given the difficulty in interpreting the statistical importance of raw AIC differences 
among candidate models, Wagenmakers and Farrell (2004) developed a method to 
easily transform raw AIC values into Akaike weights (Akaike, 1978; Burnham & 
Anderson, 2002), which represent the relative likelihood of each model and can be 
interpreted in terms of conditional probabilities. To obtain the Akaike weights for our four 
candidate models we first calculated their ΔAIC scores, where 
            Δq(AIC) = AICq – min AIC,               (9) 
with minAIC being the smallest AIC value and, by implication, the best model having a 
ΔAIC score of 0. Next, we calculated the relative likelihood of each candidate model, that 
is 
            exp{-0.5 Δq(AIC)}.                          (10) 
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Finally, we calculated the Akaike weights wq(AIC) by normalizing the relative model 
likelihoods, where 
              𝑤𝑞(𝐴𝐼𝐶) =
exp⁡{−0.5⁡∆𝑞(𝐴𝐼𝐶)}
∑ exp⁡{−0.5⁡∆𝑞(𝐴𝐼𝐶)}
𝑄
𝑞=1
 ,                      (11) 
such that ∑wq(AIC) = 1. Weight wq(AIC) can be interpreted as a probability estimate that 
Mq is the best model in terms of minimizing information loss, given the data and the set 
of candidate models (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004). Thus, we identified the AIC-best 
model for older adults and the AIC-best model for younger adults on the basis of the 
candidate model with the smallest AIC score and the highest Akaike weight in each 
respective age group. 
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3.4. Statistical Analyses 
We programmed the likelihood functions for all candidate models in MATLAB and 
estimated different versions of the HB13 model using MATLAB’s optimization toolbox. 
The p-values and 95% confidence intervals reported for the model fit tests and for the 
logistic HB13 hypotheses tests were based on 500 bootstrapped samples. Given the 
length of time required to complete the heterogeneity tests on each parameter, these 
analyses were based on 100 bootstrapped samples. We used the parametric bootstrap 
exclusively to determine p-values, because p-values based on the asymptotic chi-square 
distribution of G2 under H0 can be severely misleading when there are many zero cells 
in the data, which was the case for our data. Thus, we dispensed with asymptotic p-
values and replaced them with estimates based on the exact distribution of G2 under H0 
using the parametric bootstrap (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). For clarity, we denote all p-
value estimates based on the parametric bootstrap method by pb. In accordance with 
prior work (e.g., Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1994; Bayen et al., 2006) we set an 
alpha-level of .01 for model fit tests because we did not want to reject a model that only 
slightly differed from the comparison model. Importantly, even at this alpha-level we had 
sufficient power to detect moderate (i.e., w = .3, Cohen, 1988) but not small (i.e., w = .1) 
deviations from the comparison model.3 Thus, setting alpha to .01 provided a balance 
between rejecting small deviations from the comparison model and detecting moderate 
model misfit issues. We provide more detailed power information in the Results section. 
We used the standard .05 alpha-level for all other analyses. We chose this conventional 
alpha-level for heterogeneity tests because we were less concerned with Type I errors, 
since this would simply result in a homogeneous parameter being modeled freely. 
3.5. Participants 
For Experiment 1, we re-analyzed data from a previously conducted study 
examining HB differences between older and younger adults (Coolin et al., 2014). For 
 
3
 Power analyses were computed with G*Power3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
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this previous study, we recruited 60 healthy community-dwelling older adults and 64 
college-aged younger adults. Community-dwelling adults over the age of 65 were 
recruited through newspaper advertisements in the Metro Vancouver area, the university 
staff union e-mail list, and academic aging seminars conducted by the corresponding 
author. This age range was selected for consistency with prior aging studies of HB (e.g., 
Bayen et al., 2006; Bernstein et al., 2011a) and to ensure adequate variability in 
cognitive performance. Older adult participants received $20 to compensate for their 
time and travel costs. The younger adults were introductory psychology students who 
received course credit for participating.   
Within each age group, we examined the distributions of observed values from 
the general multinomial model and predicted values from the logistic HB13 model to 
identify individuals who had predicted values that were substantially different from their 
observed values. We used the following criterion to identify extreme values: An 
individual was an outlier if its residual 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦?̂? was larger than three times the standard 
deviation of the n-1 remaining residuals within that age group. Our outlier analyses 
revealed no outliers in our older adult group, but two outliers in our younger adult group. 
Thus, after excluding these two outliers, the younger adult sample consisted of 62 
individuals, and the older adult sample remained at 60. Demographic and health 
characteristics of the sample can be found in Table 3.5. 
Participants met the following inclusion criteria: (a) English fluency as determined 
by an acculturation measure developed within our lab that examines language 
preferences (Thornton et al., 2007), (b) a minimum of grade 7 education (i.e., completion 
of primary school) to ensure that reading level was adequate for questionnaire 
completion, and (c) no vision (corrected vision ≤ 20/50), hearing or other sensory or 
motor impairments that might interfere with testing. In addition, the exclusion criteria 
included: (a) self-reported diagnosis of major psychotic illness by a physician, (b) 
concurrent acute illness (e.g., terminal cancer) that may affect testing, (c) neurological 
disorder (e.g., Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease, multiple sclerosis, epilepsy), 
(c) significant head injury or stroke that affected daily living activities, (d) a self-reported 
diagnosis of dementia by a physician and/or a score of less than 24 on the Mini Mental 
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Status Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), and (e) alcohol consumption 
of greater than 3 ounces/day.  
 
Table 3.5.     Demographic and Health Characteristics of Participants (n = 124) 
 Younger Adults (n = 64) Older Adults (n= 60)  
Characteristics Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Age  20.1 (1.9) 72.5 (4.9) 
     Range 18-25 65-87 
Gender (% female) 70.3 58.3 
Ethnicity (%)   
     Caucasian 50.0 85.0 
     East Asian 28.1 5.0 
     South Asian 9.4 8.3 
     Other 12.5 1.7 
ESL (%) 29.7 28.3 
Education  13.4 (1.9) 14.3 (3.0) 
Cardiovascular risks (% diagnosed)   
     Hypertension 0.0 46.7 
     Type 2 diabetes  0.0 10.0 
     High cholesterol  0.0 43.3 
     Cardiovascular disease 0.0 20.0 
     Previous heart attack 0.0 10.0 
Smoking Status (%)   
     Currently 14.1 3.4 
     Never 78.1 53.3 
Alcohol Use (yes %) 65.6 65.0 
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3.6. Measures 
The following measures were administered and scored by trained research 
assistants following manualized procedures. All study protocols were approved by the 
Simon Fraser University research ethics board prior to administration. 
3.6.1     HB Memory Judgment Task 
We assessed HB using a memory judgment design, which consisted of an 
Original Judgment (OJ) questionnaire and a Recall of the Original Judgment (ROJ) 
questionnaire. The OJ questionnaire included 54 trivia questions (see Appendix C) 
adopted from Bayen et al. (2006) and Hardt and Pohl (2003). One question, “When was 
Socrates born?” was excluded from the analyses because some participants responded 
in B.C. and others in A.D., which prohibited the aggregation of responses across 
participants. We provided participants with the metric-system unit with which they had to 
respond. We randomized the order of the questions, and then presented questions in a 
fixed order to all participants. The ROJ questionnaire required participants to recall their 
OJs to the 54 questions. Participants were told that they would learn the CJs to half the 
questions (experimental items), but not the other half (control items), and that their task 
was to recall their OJs to all the questions. To control for the content of specific 
questions, we counterbalanced the control and experimental items by randomly 
assigning participants to one of two versions. In Version one, the first 27 items were 
experimental and the last 27 were control, and vice-versa in Version two.   
3.6.2. Global Mental Status 
We used the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975) to 
inform inclusion decisions and provide a description of the global mental status of our 
older adult sample. The MMSE assesses five cognitive domains: orientation, 
registration, attention and calculation, recall, and language. Scores range between 0 and 
30. A cut-off score of 24 is typically use for screening dementia (Oosterman, de Vries, & 
Scherder, 2007; Paran, Anson, & Reuveni, 2003). All of the older adults participants 
scored higher than 24 on this measure (M = 28.66, SD = 1.15). The MMSE has 
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demonstrated reliability and validity of responses in geriatric populations (Kurlowicz & M, 
1999) and has adequate internal consistency of responses (α = 0.77) in community 
populations (Holzer, Tischler, Leaf, & Myers, 1984). 
3.6.3 Inhibitory Control 
We measured inhibition using the Color-Word Interference test or “Stroop test” 
from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 
2001). This test involved inhibiting a dominant verbal response (word reading) in favor of 
a less dominant response (color naming). Because performance is measured by time-to-
completion, we used the recommended procedure for minimizing the effect of 
processing speed by subtracting the baseline (color naming condition) from the inhibition 
condition (Delis et al., 2001). Although this “Stroop” test is typically labelled as a pre-
potent response inhibition task, like many tests of inhibition, it is not a process pure 
measure and likely involves several inhibitory processes (see Lustig et al., 2007). For 
example, the access function of inhibition may be involved in preventing task-irrelevant 
word information from entering working memory. Given a failure in access control, 
suppression and restraint functions may be involved in avoiding a dominant reading 
response. Each of these inhibitory processes may be relevant to the demands of the 
memory judgment task. The Color-Word Interference test has adequate internal 
consistency (α = 0.75; Delis et al., 2001) and validity of responses in detecting inhibitory 
dysfunction in experimental populations (Homack, Lee, & Riccio, 2005) 
3.6.4 Episodic Memory 
We measured episodic memory using the long delay free recall trial (number of 
words recalled) of the California Verbal Learning Test-2 (CVLT-II; Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, 
& Ober, 2000), which assesses the ability to recall a list of 16 words after a 20-min 
delay. The CVLT-II has high internal consistency (α= .94; Delis et al., 2000) and 
demonstrated validity of responses in adults across age and sex (Paolo, Troster, & 
Ryan, 1997). 
 30 
3.6.5 Working Memory Capacity 
We measured working memory capacity using the raw scores obtained on the 
Letter-Number Sequencing and Backward Digit Span subtests of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997). Both of these tasks assesses the ability 
to actively hold and manipulate auditory information in short-term memory. In the former 
task, the examiner reads different combinations of numbers and letters and the 
participant first recalls the number(s) in ascending order, followed by the letter(s) in 
alphabetical order. In the latter task, the examiner reads a string of digits and the 
participant reproduces the digits in the reverse order. Both subtests have high internal 
reliability (Digit Span: Fisher’s z = .90; Letter-Number Sequencing: Fisher’s z = .82; 
Wechsler, 1997) and have been shown to measure the same construct as working 
memory tasks used in cognitive experimental research (e.g., n-back task; Kane & Engle, 
2002; Hill et al., 2010). Given the strong correlations between these two measures in our 
sample (older: r = .64, p < .001; younger: r = .47, p < .001), we created a working 
memory composite by converting the data on both variables to z scores and then 
summing them (Edgington, 1995, p. 183). Refer to table 3.6.5 for the mean scores on 
each of the cognitive ability measures. 
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Table 3.6.5.     Performance on Cognitive on Ability Tests 
Note. D-KEFS = Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (Delis et al., 2001); CVLT-II = 
California Verbal Learning Test-2 (Delis et al., 2000); WAIS-III = Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-III (Wechsler, 1997). aHigher scores reflect poorer performance;  
bHigher scores reflect better performance. Scaled scores have a mean of 10 and a 
standard deviation of 3. The Backward Digit Span subtest represents only one 
component of the WAIS-IV Digit Span test, and thus scaled scores are not available. 
3.7. Procedures 
Trained research assistants tested participants individually in a single 2-h 
session at the Simon Fraser University Cognitive Aging Laboratory. Following informed 
consent, the session began with the OJ questionnaire of the memory judgment HB task. 
Following the OJ questionnaire, participants completed the battery of cognitive tests, 
which lasted approximately 90-min. Following this retention period, participants 
completed the ROJ questionnaire. Completion of both the OJ and the ROJ 
questionnaires was self-paced; participants took 10-20 min to complete each 
questionnaire. Participants took brief rest breaks, as needed. 
Cognitive Ability Test 
Cognitive 
Ability  
     Raw Score 
     Mean (SD) 
Younger      Older  
    Scaled Score                         
      Mean (SD) 
Younger     Older 
D-KEFS: Color-Word 
Interference - Color Naminga 
Speed 
26.36 
(4.27) 
33.08 
(6.32) 
10.52 
(2.02) 
10.20 
(2.32) 
D-KEFS: Color-Word 
Interference - Inhibitiona 
Inhibitory 
Control 
44.17 
(9.87) 
65.77 
(17.40) 
11.55 
(2.40) 
11.23 
(2.68) 
D-KEFS: Color-Word 
Interference - Contrasta 
Inhibitory 
Control 
(no speed) 
17.81 
(7.10) 
31.61 
(11.40) 
11.03 11.03 
CVLT-II: Long Delay Free 
Recall - Words Recalledb 
Episodic 
Memory 
12.81 
(2.44) 
8.63 
(3.33) 
10.84 
(2.82) 
9.87 
(2.82) 
WAIS-III: Backward Digit Span 
- Strings Recalledb 
Working 
Memory  
7.97 
(2.03) 
6.92 
(2.24) 
-- -- 
WAIS-III: Letter-Number 
Sequencing - Strings Recalledb 
Working 
Memory  
11.77 
(2.62) 
9.20 
(3.06) 
10.80 
(2.53) 
11.00 
(3.19) 
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Chapter 4.  
Results 
4.1. Older Adult Model Tests 
4.1.1. Goodness-of-Fit of the Unconstrained HB13 Model with 
Respect to the General Multinomial Model 
Our first statistical test concerned the fit of the unconstrained HB13 model to the 
probabilities of the observed HB data for each of the n individuals in the older adult 
group. We compared the unconstrained HB13 model against the general multinomial 
model for 2 · 10 data categories and n individuals using parametric bootstrapping. Each 
model contains S · n parameters, where S denotes the number of unconstrained 
parameters in the respective HB model. For n = 60 participants, the unconstrained HB13 
model has 13 · 60 = 780 parameters, and the general multinomial model has 18 · 60 = 
1,080 parameters. With an alpha-level of .01, N = 3,135 (60 participants · 53 items - 45 
missing responses), and df = 300, we had adequate power (>.99) to detect moderate 
deviations (w = .3) from the general multinomial model, but insufficient power (.15) to 
detect small deviations (w = .1). On the basis of 500 bootstrapped samples, we initially 
failed to find an acceptable model fit, ∆G2(300) = 337.95, pb < .001. Following the 
procedures of Bayen et al. (2006), we identified two items that had a disproportionately 
high number of observations in the ROJ = OJ < CJ category relative to the ROJ = OJ > 
CJ category and one item that had a disproportionately high number of observations in 
the CJ < ROJ < OJ relative to the OJ < ROJ < CJ category. Thus, these three items 
violated the symmetry assumption of the model. After excluding these problematic items, 
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the remaining data set consisted of 50 items and had an acceptable model fit, ∆G2(300) 
= 309.18, pb = .01. 
4.1.2. Simplification of the HB13 Model 
To determine the model specification of the simplified HB13 model, we tested for 
heterogeneity in each of the 13 model parameters.This involved testing the 
unconstrained HB13 model against a null model in which the parameter of interest was a 
constant and the remaining 12 parameters were unconstrained. If we rejected the null 
that the parameter is equal across individuals, then in the simplified HB13 model the 
corresponding parameter would be left unconstrained.Each null model has 12 · 60 + 1 = 
721 parameters. With an alpha-level of .05, N = 2,955, and df = 59, we had adequate 
power (>.99) to detect moderate deviations (w = .3) of the unconstrained HB13 model 
from each of the null models, but low power (.75) to detect small deviations (w = .1).   
Table 4.1.2 depicts the results of the heterogeneity tests, as well as summary 
statistics on these parameters.On the basis of 100 bootstrapped samples, we rejected 
the null model that the ancillary parameter was a constant for two of the nine ancillary 
parameters -- namely, gl1k and gg1k. These parameters affect the distribution of unbiased 
OJ reconstructions (i.e., reconstructions given no perfect OJ recollection) and represent 
probabilities of reconstructing ROJs that deviate from the CJ in the direction of the OJ.  
With regard to the core parameters, we rejected the null models that the core 
parameters bk, rCk, and rEk were equal across individuals. As expected, participants 
differed in how often they shifted their ROJ toward the CJ relative to the OJ (i.e., 
reconstruction bias) as well as in their ability to recollect their OJs perfectly, in both the 
presence (rEk) and absence (rCk) of outcome knowledge. Conversely, we accepted the 
null model that parameter ck was equal across individuals. 
On the basis of the results of these heterogeneity tests, we defined the simplified 
HB13 model as follows: The ancillary parameters gl1k and gg1k and the core parameters 
bk, rCk, rEk were unconstrained across individuals, and parameter c and the remaining 
seven ancillary parameters were constrained to be equal across individuals. The 
simplified model has S · n + z parameters, where S denotes the number of 
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unconstrained parameters and z denotes the number of parameters that were simplified 
to constants. Thus, the simplified HB13 model has 5 · 60 + 8 = 308 parameters. With an 
alpha-level of .01, N = 2,955, and df = 472, we had adequate power (>.99) to detect 
moderate deviations (w = .3) from the unconstrained HB13 model, but insufficient power 
(.09) to detect small deviations (w = .1). As expected, on the basis of 500 bootstrapped 
samples, the simplified HB13 model had an acceptable model fit, ∆G2(472) = 425.76, pb 
= .19. 
Table 4.1.2.   Heterogeneity Tests of the HB13 Parameters Based on the Older 
Adult Dataset (n = 60) 
Parameter 
Unconstrained Coefficient 
Mean                          SD 
ΔG2 pb 
Ancillary Parameters     
gl1k .81 .15 87.04 .03 
gg1k .86 .11 88.53 .046 
gl2k .48 .20 69.87 .46 
gg2k .49 .17 69.38 .41 
gl3k .67 .29 60.34 .89 
gg3k .65 .32 55.16 .62 
lEk .44 .11 73.75 .15 
lCk .45 .09 50.89 .76 
hk .01 .02 22.15     >.99 
Core Parameters     
bk .46 .26 81.95      <.001 
rCk .23 .10           108.35     <.001 
rEk .20 .13           153.12     <.001 
ck .03 .10 22.65    >.99 
Note. The means and standard deviations are based on the older adult unconstrained 
HB13 model. The ∆G2 statistics represent the model tests comparing the unconstrained 
HB13 model to a null model in which the parameter of interest was a constant and the 
remaining 12 parameters were unconstrained. The p-value (denoted as pb) for the ∆G
2 is 
based on 100 bootstrapped samples. A significant ∆G2 indicates heterogeneity in the 
parameter while a non-significant ∆G2 indicates homogeneity. 
4.1.3. Logistic HB13 Model 
We then introduced the logistic HB13 model by replacing the unconstrained core 
parameters bk, rCk, and rEk in the simplified HB13 model with logistic functions of 
inhibition, episodic memory, and working memory capacity, respectively. The logistic 
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HB13 model has S · n + (3 · (C + 1)) + z parameters, where S is the number of 
unconstrained HB13 parameters, C is the number of cognitive variables in each bias 
function (three in our case), the 1 accounts for the constant terms in each bias function, 
and z is the number of parameters that were simplified to a constant. Thus, the number 
of parameters in the logistic HB13 model was 2 · 60 + (3 · (3 + 1)) + 8 = 140. 
4.1.4. Model Selection for the Older Adult Sample 
We compared the previously described four candidate models (general 
multinomial, unconstrained HB13, simplified HB13, and logistic HB13) to identify which 
model provides the best approximation of the true model underlying our older adult data. 
The AIC values and Akaike weights for each of the models are shown in Table 4.1.4. 
The model associated with the smallest AIC value and the highest Akaike weight was 
the logistic HB13 model. In fact, the probability estimate that the logistic HB13 model 
was the best of our four candidate models was very close to 1. Also note that the AIC 
values decrease with each model introduced, indicating that the models became 
progressively better in terms of the compromise between descriptive accuracy and 
parsimony as we progressed through our model hierarchy. 
 
Table 4.1.4.   AIC Values and Akaike Weights for the Four Candidate HB Models by 
Age Group 
Model AICq 
Older         Younger 
Δq (AIC) 
Older        Younger 
wq (AIC) 
 Older        Younger 
General Multinomial 12,868 13,321 841 909 <.001 <.001 
Unconstrained HB13 12,577 12,988 550 577 <.001 <.001 
Simplified HB13 12,059 12,438 32 26 <.001 <.001 
Logistic HB13 12,027 12,411 0 0 >.99 >.99 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; Δq (AIC) = [AICq – min(AIC)]; wq (AIC) = rounded 
Akaike weights interpreted as the probability that Model q is the best model given the 
dataset and set of candidate models. 
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4.1.5. Hypothesis Testing 
Using the logistic HB13 model, we tested our primary hypotheses regarding the 
role of cognitive functioning in the underlying HB processes. This analysis involved 
bootstrapping the 95% confidence intervals for the beta coefficients on each cognitive 
covariate for each of the core parameters.4  As is shown in Table 4.1.5, our analyses of 
older adults revealed that episodic memory was the only significant predictor of rCk, β = 
0.06, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.10], pb < .001, such that one standard deviation increase in 
episodic memory scores was associated with a 3.6% increase in the mean estimated rCk.  
Yet both episodic memory, β = 0.07, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.11], pb < .001, and inhibition, β =  
-0.02, 95% CI = [-0.04, -0.01], pb < .001, were significant predictors of rEk:  One standard 
deviation increase in episodic memory scores was associated with a 4.3% increase in 
the mean estimated rEk, and one standard deviation increase in inhibition scores was 
associated with a 7.9% decrease in mean estimated rEk. Furthermore, in the older adult 
sample working memory capacity was a marginally significant predictor of rEk, β = 0.06, 
95% CI = [-0.003, 0.13], pb = .056, such that one standard deviation increase in working 
memory scores was associated with a 1.9% increase in mean estimated rEk. The 
significant contribution of inhibition and marginally significant contribution of working 
memory capacity to rEk but not to rCk suggests that these abilities explain the reduction in 
recollection rates due to the presentation of the CJ (i.e., recollection bias). Finally, 
inhibition was the only significant predictor of bk, β = 0.04, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.07], pb < 
.001, such that one standard deviation increase in inhibition scores was associated with 
a 11.5% increase in mean estimated bk. 
 
 
 
4
Given that general slowing of processing speed often accounts for age-related changes in other 
cognitive functions (Salthouse, 2000), we conducted an additional analysis to identify whether our 
findings held after including a measure of processing speed (Digit Symbol Coding subtest of the 
WAIS-III). The findings from our main analyses held, suggesting that processing speed did not 
account for the effects of the cognitive covariates on the HB parameters. Furthermore, processing 
speed did not significantly contribute to the HB parameters. 
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Table 4.1.5.    Model Tests for the Logistic HB13 Model by Age Group 
Cognitive Function 
Coefficient 
 
Older     Younger 
pb (two-tailed) 
 
Older    Younger 
Recollection: Control (rCk)      
αC0 -1.39 -0.47   
βC1 (Inhibition) -0.01 -0.01   .32 .12 
βC2 (Episodic Memory)  0.06  0.01 <.001 .81 
βC3 (Working Memory)  0.03  0.001   .33 .84 
Recollection: Experimental (rEk)     
αE0 -1.34 -0.77   
βE1 (Inhibition) -0.02  0.002 <.001 .80 
βE2 (Episodic Memory)  0.07  0.001 <.001 .96 
βE3 (Working Memory)  0.06  0.04    .06 .29 
Reconstruction Bias (bk)     
αb0 -1.49  0.54   
βb1 (Inhibition)  0.04 -0.02 <.001 .22 
βb2 (Episodic Memory) -0.004 -0.06   .96 .27 
βb3 (Working Memory)  0.08 -0.04   .24 .62 
Note. The p-values (denoted pb) for the cognitive covariate tests are based on 
bootstrapping the 95% confidence intervals for the beta coefficients on each cognitive 
covariate for each of the core parameters. 
4.2. Younger Adult Model Tests 
4.2.1. Goodness-of-Fit of the Unconstrained HB13 Model with 
Respect to the General Multinomial Model 
Following the same model hierarchy as in older adults, we began by assessing 
the goodness-of-fit of the unconstrained HB13 model in our younger adult comparison 
group. We based our analyses on the 50 item dataset that provided an acceptable 
model fit in our older adult group. For n = 62 participants, the unconstrained HB13 model 
has 13 · 62 = 806 parameters, and the general multinomial model has 18 · 62 = 1,116 
parameters. With an alpha-level of .01, N = 3,085 (62 participants · 50 items - 15 missing 
responses), and df = 310, we had adequate power (>.99) to detect moderate deviations 
(w = .3) from the general multinomial model, but insufficient power (.14) to detect small 
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deviations (w = .1). On the basis of 500 bootstrapped samples, using the 50 item dataset 
we found an acceptable model fit, ∆G2(310) = 287.49, pb = .82. 
4.2.2. Simplification of the HB13 Model 
Rather than conducting separate heterogeneity tests for younger adults, we 
assessed whether the simplified HB13 model that we defined for older adults was also 
an acceptable model for younger adults. This was necessary to avoid varying results 
across age groups due to different model specifications. The simplified model has S · n 
+ z parameters, where S denotes the number of unconstrained parameters and z 
denotes the number of parameters that were simplified to constants. Thus, the younger 
adult simplified HB13 model has 5 · 62 + 8 = 318 parameters. With an alpha-level of .01, 
N = 3,085, and df = 488, we had adequate power (>.99) to detect moderate deviations 
(w = .3) from the unconstrained HB13 model, but insufficient power (.09) to detect small 
deviations (w = .1). As expected, on the basis of 500 bootstrapped samples, the 
simplified HB13 model for the older adult sample also fit the younger adult data, 
∆G2(488) = 425.43, pb = .02. Thus, we used the same model specification for the 
simplified HB13 model in older and younger adults. 
4.2.3. Logistic HB13 Model 
We then introduced the logistic HB13 model by replacing the unconstrained core 
parameters bk, rCk, and rEk in the simplified HB13 model with logistic functions of 
inhibition, episodic memory, and working memory capacity, respectively. The logistic 
HB13 model has S · n + (3 · (C + 1)) + z parameters, where S is the number of 
unconstrained HB13 parameters, C is the number of cognitive variables in each bias 
function, the 1 accounts for the constant terms in each bias function, and z is the number 
of parameters that were simplified to a constant. Thus, the number of parameters in the 
younger adult logistic HB13 model was 2 · 62 + (3 · (3 + 1)) + 8 = 144. 
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4.2.4. Model Selection for the Younger Adult Sample 
We compared our four candidate models following the same rationale as for the 
older adult dataset. The AIC values and Akaike weights for each of the models are 
summarized in Table 4.1.4. Again, the model associated with the smallest AIC value and 
an Akaike weight close to 1 was the logistic HB13 model. We also replicated the 
decrease in AIC values from the most complex model (i.e., the general multinomial 
model) to the least complex model (i.e., the logistic HB13 model) for the younger adult 
sample. Thus, the logistic HB13 model provided the best balance between model fit and 
parsimony for both the older and younger adults. 
4.2.5. Hypothesis Testing 
In line with these model selection results, we tested our primary hypotheses 
regarding the role of cognitive functioning in the underlying HB processes using the 
logistic HB13 model. As is shown in Table 4.1.5, on the basis of 500 bootstrapped 
samples, the 95% confidence intervals for the beta coefficients revealed that none of the 
cognitive covariates significantly predicted bk, rCk, or rEk in the younger adults. 
Nonetheless, the pattern of effects of the cognitive covariates on the HB parameters was 
similar to those observed in older adults. In fact, the direction of all but one of the six 
beta coefficients required to predict recollection of control (rC) and experimental items 
(rE) were the same across age groups. The picture is a bit more confusing for 
reconstruction bias b, where only the direction of the beta coefficient for episodic 
memory was the same across age groups. Most likely, the effects of inhibition and 
working memory capacity on b were very weak, or even absent, in younger adults, so 
that sampling error caused deviations of the regression coefficient estimates in the 
unexpected direction. The lack of statistical significance of all coefficients for younger 
adults is consistent with this explanation. 
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Chapter 5.  
Discussion 
We have proposed a novel logistic HB13 multinomial model to assess the 
cognitive abilities that contribute to the underlying HB processes in older and younger 
adults. Our model selection analysis indicated that, given our data and a set of four 
candidate models (see Table 3.1.4), the logistic HB13 model was clearly the best 
approximation to the true model underlying the data for both older and younger adult 
groups, and was the model that provided the best balance between model accuracy and 
parsimony. Consistent with our predictions, our findings revealed that in older adults (1) 
individuals with higher episodic memory had higher recollection of their OJ in the 
absence of outcome knowledge, (2) individuals with higher episodic memory, inhibitory 
control, and working memory capacity had higher recollection of their OJ in the presence 
of outcome knowledge, and (3) conditional on a failure to recall their OJ, individuals with 
higher inhibitory control were less likely to be influenced by outcome knowledge when 
reconstructing their forgotten OJs (i.e., reconstruction bias). In younger adults, 
descriptively, most of the regression coefficients for the cognitive covariates were in the 
same direction as those of older adults, but none of the effects attained statistical 
significance.   
Ours is the first study to model inter-individual variation in the underlying 
processes that contribute to HB. This is an important advancement over prior 
applications of the HB13 multinomial model, which estimated a fixed set of 13 
parameters for the entire sample (Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998). The approach presented 
in this paper is a variation of Klauer’s (2010) latent-trait model that can be easily 
implemented and adapted to any experimental paradigm. The primary difference 
between Klauer’s model and our logistic model is that the former requires the 
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assumption of joint distribution of the model parameters and covariates, whereas the 
latter only requires a distributional assumption about the error in predicting the model 
parameters from the covariates. Furthermore, in our logistic model we assume that the 
error term associated with the model parameters is logistically distributed rather than 
normally distributed. Subsequently, we arrive at a model in which the processes (e.g.,, 
reconstruction bias, bk) are modeled as a logistic function of covariates rather than an 
ogive function. In Appendix A, we demonstrate that replacing logistically distributed 
errors with normally distributed errors does not change the substantive conclusions. The 
other difference is in the estimation method: Whereas Klauer used a Bayesian approach, 
we use a maximum likelihood approach. The latter approach requires fewer distributional 
assumptions and less computational effort, and is easier to implement.   
Given the large inter-individual variation in cognitive functioning in older adults, 
our primary interest was in modeling individual differences in the underlying HB 
processes in an older adult population; however, we also included a younger adult 
comparison group to assess whether the findings generalize to this age group. For both 
age groups, we followed a series of model steps to arrive at our final logistic HB13 
model. One of our model steps involved examining whether there was significant 
heterogeneity in the HB13 parameters. Given that we would expect older adults to have 
the largest variability in the underlying processes, we performed the heterogeneity tests 
on this age group. We then demonstrated that the resulting model was also acceptable 
for our younger adult group. The results of the heterogeneity tests suggest that ancillary 
parameters gl1k and gg1k might be conceived of as heterogeneous. These parameters 
represent probabilities of reconstructing ROJs that deviate from the CJ in the direction of 
the OJ. Although this “partial OJ memory” does not suffice for a perfect recollection (ROJ 
= OJ), it allows for a reconstructed ROJ that is “close” to the OJ. Our findings thus 
indicate that participants differ in their ability to generate good, unbiased reconstructions 
that are close approximations of the OJ. With regard to the core parameters, 
heterogeneity tests revealed that parameters bk, rCk and rEk were heterogeneous, 
whereas parameter ck was homogenous. Given that reconstruction bias is one of the 
primary contributors to HB, we expected individual variation in the frequency with which 
individuals shift their ROJ toward the CJ. Our finding that participants differed in their 
ability to recollect the OJ was also expected given the large variation in recall ability in 
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older adults (e.g., Christensen et al., 1994; Riddle, 2007). Furthermore, the finding of 
homogeneity in CJ adoptions was not surprising, given prior reports of a low probability 
of CJ adoptions in adults (e.g., Bayen et al., 2006; Bernstein et al., 2011a).  
In our final model step, we used the logistic HB13 model to test whether 
variability in cognitive functioning explained individual variation in the HB processes in 
older and younger adults. In older adults, as expected, higher episodic memory 
predicted higher OJ recall in the absence of outcome knowledge (rCk). Moreover, higher 
episodic memory and inhibitory control each predicted higher OJ recall in the presence 
of outcome knowledge (rEk). It is also noteworthy that working memory capacity was a 
marginally significant predictor of recollection rates in the presence (pb = .056), but not 
the absence (pb = .33), of outcome knowledge. The significant contribution of inhibition 
and the marginally significant contribution of working memory capacity to rEk but not rCk 
suggest that the ability to recall a prior judgment in the presence of new knowledge 
depends on one’s ability to suppress irrelevant information (i.e., CJ), and potentially 
depends on one’s ability to discriminate multiple pieces of information in mind during 
recall. Thus, older adults with lower inhibitory control and working memory capacity may 
be more susceptible to recollection bias. Our findings also revealed that inhibitory control 
was important in the reconstruction stage, such that individuals with lower inhibitory 
control were more likely to exhibit reconstruction bias. These findings suggest that the 
accuracy of reconstructive processes depend on the ability to suppress outcome 
knowledge that may otherwise influence the reconstruction process. 
In younger adults, with the exception of the effects of inhibition on the rEk and bk 
parameters and the effect of working memory capacity on the bk parameter, the pattern 
of effects of the cognitive covariates on the HB parameters was similar to that observed 
in older adults; however, none of these effects reached statistical significance. Although 
the direction of the effects was often in agreement across age groups, the question 
remains why we obtain strong effects in older adults and weaker effects in younger 
adults. We propose two possible answers to this question: (1) There is little variability in 
HB in younger adults, and/or (2) there is little variability in cognitive functioning in 
younger adults. To test the first possibility, we conducted post-hoc heterogeneity tests 
on each of the core HB parameters in younger adults. On the basis of 100 bootstrapped 
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samples, our findings revealed that parameter rCk [G
2(61) = 115.69, pb < .001], parameter 
rEk [G
2(61) = 136.85, pb < .001], and parameter bk [G
2(61) = 83.99, pb < .001] were 
heterogeneous. Thus, these findings do not support the first possibility. To test for the 
second possibility, we conducted F tests to assess equality of variance of the cognitive 
covariates in older and younger adults. The variances in older adults were about twice 
as large as those in younger adults. Subsequently, we rejected the null hypothesis that 
the variances were equal across age groups for inhibition [F(59, 61) = 2.86, p < .001], 
episodic memory [F(59, 61) = 1.87, p = .01], and working memory [F(59, 61) = 1.55, p = 
.046]. Thus, we believe that the weaker effects in our younger adult logistic HB13 model 
were most likely due to younger adults having less variability in cognitive functioning, as 
compared to older adults.  
Taken together, the present findings advance our understanding of HB by 
identifying why older adults are more prone to it. We revealed that older adults with 
lower inhibitory control, and potentially those with lower working memory capacity, are 
more likely to forget their original predictions in the presence of outcome knowledge. 
Perhaps poorer ability to suppress the CJ results in this information interfering with the 
retrieval of the OJ. Subsequently, these individuals must reconstruct their forgotten 
original predictions. During this reconstruction process, older adults with lower inhibitory 
control are more likely to rely on outcome knowledge to guide this reconstructive 
process. These findings suggest that inhibitory control is important in recollection and 
reconstruction processes, and potentially a major contributor to HB in older adults. 
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Chapter 6.  
 
Experiment 2: Introduction 
A limitation of the logistic HB13 model is that it is based on a regression 
(correlational) approach and thus the findings only inform us of associations between 
various cognitive abilities and the underlying HB processes. In this experiment, we 
directly assess the impact of inhibition on recollection and reconstruction biases by 
experimentally manipulating inhibition demands during the HB task. In Experiment 1, we 
used between-subjects variation in cognitive ability to assess how HB varies across 
individuals with different levels of cognitive functioning. In this experiment, we employ an 
experimental manipulation approach that uses within-subjects variation in HB to assess 
how HB changes when an individual’s cognitive abilities are taxed. A benefit of this latter 
approach is that it allows for a direct comparison of an individual’s HB performance with 
and without cognitive load, reducing the error arising from natural between-subjects 
variance. This provides a more robust test of inhibition in the underlying bias processes 
because differences in HB across conditions are presumably due to the inhibition 
demands induced by the secondary task. Thus, if inhibitory control is important in the 
underlying recollection and reconstruction processes, we would expect increased biases 
under cognitive load. 
Nevertheless, lowering an individual’s inhibitory capacities through cognitive load 
is not equivalent to examining an individual with inherently low inhibitory control. For 
example, whether an individuals’ reconstruction bias is lowered by cognitive load may 
depend on other factors, such as their inherent cognitive abilities and the strategies they 
employ to cope with the additional task demands. A benefit of the manipulation approach 
is that we can assess how manipulation effects vary across individuals as a function of 
their inherent cognitive abilities, which can elucidate under what conditions individuals 
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are susceptible to HB. The manipulation approach also provides a more realistic 
representation of HB in the real world where attention is often divided between activities. 
Thus, the primary aims of this experiment were to (1) directly test the role of 
inhibitory control in older adults’ recollection and reconstruction biases and (2) assess 
for individual differences in how cognitive load affects HB performance. In addition to the 
standard control and experimental conditions used in Experiment 1, participants 
completed a cognitive load condition specifically tailored to maximize CJ inhibition 
demands during the ROJ task. In this condition, the CJ was presented for 10 s 
immediately preceding the ROJ to each question. Participants were required to recall the 
correct judgment (RCJ) immediately before (RCJ1) and after (RCJ2) providing the usual 
ROJ to each question. The cognitive load condition thus required participants to 
rehearse the CJ, separate the CJ and OJ, and then select the relevant information 
during ROJ generation (i.e., OJ) while inhibiting the irrelevant information that is 
simultaneously rehearsed (i.e., CJ). Thus, the cognitive load condition had higher 
inhibition demands because information that is actively processed is more salient and 
accessible in memory and thus more difficult to suppress (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). 
We first attempted to replicate the logistic model findings from Experiment 1 with 
a new sample of older adults. To facilitate comparisons across experiments, we used the 
same cognitive ability tests as in Experiment 1 to investigate whether recollection ability 
and reconstruction bias vary as functions of individual differences in (1) inhibition, (2) 
episodic memory, and (3) working memory capacity. We then conducted our primary 
analyses assessing the effects of the inhibition manipulation on the underlying HB 
processes. We considered whether the manipulation had an additive or interactive effect 
with cognitive ability on these processes. An additive effect would suggest that the 
manipulation had an equal effect across individuals, whereas an interactive effect would 
suggest that the effect varied across individuals as a function of cognitive ability. 
Based on our findings in Experiment 1, we expected additive effects of the 
manipulation on the HB parameters. First, compared to hindsight judgments in the 
standard experimental condition, we expected hindsight judgments in the cognitive load 
condition to be characterized by lower OJ recollection rates for experimental items 
 46 
(lower parameter rE) due to increased interference effects from mentally rehearsing the 
CJ during ROJ generation. This would imply that cognitive load increased recollection 
bias (rEL - rC > rES - rC). Second, we expected higher reconstruction bias (parameter b) in 
the cognitive load condition compared to the standard experimental condition due to the 
CJ being more accessible during ROJ generation. Finally, we expected higher CJ 
adoptions (parameter c) in the cognitive load condition compared to the standard 
experimental condition due to increased accessibility of the CJ and thus stronger 
susceptibility to source monitoring errors. 
With regard to potential interactive effects, we propose two competing 
predictions: (1) cognitive load would primarily impair individuals with low cognitive ability, 
and (2) cognitive load would primarily impair individuals with high cognitive ability. The 
first outcome would be consistent with general capacity theories (see Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; McDowd & Craik, 1988; Salthouse, Rogan, & Prill, 1984), 
which posit that cognitive capacity declines in older adults and is limited by the 
resources that are currently available. According to this theory, we would expect 
cognitive load to decrease recollection ability (parameter rE) and increase reconstruction 
bias (parameter b) and CJ adoptions (parameter c) in individuals with low cognitive 
ability. Conversely, we would expect cognitive load to have less impact on these 
processes in individuals with high cognitive ability because these individuals have 
sufficient resources to cope with the additional task demands. The second outcome 
would suggest that cognitive load has an equalizing effect on the available processing 
resources among individuals with high and low cognitive ability, such that individuals 
with high cognitive ability perform more similarly to those with low cognitive ability. This 
is consistent with the dual-task approach to assessing age differences in memory 
performance after equating processing resources in younger and older adults via 
cognitive load (e.g., Smith, Horn, & Bayen, 2013; Somberg & Salthouse, 1982). 
According to this theory, we would expect cognitive load to decrease recollection ability 
(parameter rE) and increase reconstruction bias (parameter b) and CJ adoptions 
(parameter c) in individuals with high cognitive ability. Further, in individuals with low 
cognitive ability, we would expect cognitive load to have less impact on these processes 
because they are apt to struggle in both the standard experimental and cognitive load 
 47 
conditions. We designed our inhibition manipulation and logistic model to test between 
these two competing interaction predictions.  
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Chapter 7.  
 
Method 
7.1. Model Based Data Analyses 
Given that the memory judgment task now consists of three conditions, the 
general multinomial model has 3 (rather than 2) conditions · 10 data categories. The 
number of unconstrained parameters per condition is equal to the number of data 
categories minus one (i.e., 3 · 9 = 27 for 3 conditions). Across n individuals, the model 
contains S · n parameters, where S denotes the number of unconstrained model 
parameters. Thus, for n = 80 participants, the general multinomial model has 27 · 80 = 
2,160 parameters. Each condition is associated with a unique processing tree and a set 
of structural equations. Many of the underlying parameters appear in all three of the 
processing trees; however, each experimental tree has six parameters that are unique to 
that tree. Given that we have two experimental conditions rather than one, each HB 
model that we introduce will have six parameters in addition to the 13 parameters of the 
HB13 model.  We thus refer to our base model as the HB19 model. Note that we use the 
subscripts “S” and “L” to denote parameters in the standard experimental and cognitive 
load conditions, respectively. 
To check the empirical adequacy of our logistic model, we followed the same 
sequence of model tests as Experiment 1. Specifically, we introduce four candidate 
models: (1) the general multinomial model, (2) the unconstrained HB19 model, (3) the 
simplified HB19 model, and (4) the logistic HB19 model. Table 7.1 presents a summary 
of each of these models. We present a model selection analysis to identify the AIC-best 
model on the basis of the candidate model with the smallest AIC score and the highest 
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Akaike weight. In addition, to facilitate comparisons with previous cognitive aging 
research in HB, we also provide analyses based on the HB19 model when applied to 
data aggregated across individuals (see Appendix D). To anticipate, the estimated core 
HB parameters are quite similar to those obtained in Experiment 1 and by prior work 
(Bayen et al., 2006; Bernstein et al., 2011a). 
Table 7.1.    Summary of the Various MPT Models  
Model Interpretation 
Number of  
Free Parameters 
General Multinomial Raw category frequencies (pijk) 3 · 9 · n 
Unconstrained HB19 HB19 model applied to n individual data sets. 
Parameters are rCk, rESk, bSk, cSk, rELk, bLk, cLk, 
. . ., k = 1, . . ., n 
19 · n 
Simplified HB19 HB19 model with core parameters (rCk, rESk, bSk, 
cSk, rELk, bLk, cLk) and all ancillary parameters 
except gl2k, gg3Sk, gg3Lk  unconstrained 
16 · n + 3 
Logistic HB19 HB19 model with rCk, rESk, bSk, cSk, rELk, bLk, and 
cLk constrained as (4-parametric) logistic 
functions of 3 individual differences variables; 
gl2k, gg3Sk, gg3Lk constant, and the remaining 
ancillary parameters unconstrained 
4 · 7 + 9 · n + 3 
7.2. Statistical Analyses 
We programmed the likelihood functions for all candidate models in MATLAB and 
estimated different versions of the HB19 model using MATLAB’s optimization toolbox.  
The p-values and 95% confidence intervals reported for the model fit tests and for the 
logistic HB19 hypotheses tests were based on 500 bootstrapped samples. Given the 
length of time required to complete the heterogeneity tests on each parameter, these 
analyses were based on 100 bootstrapped samples. Because p-values based on the 
asymptotic chi-square distribution of G2 under H0 can be severely misleading when 
there are many zero cells in the data (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993), we used the parametric 
bootstrap to obtain p-value (denoted as pb) estimates based on the exact distribution of 
G2 under H0. Following others (Bayen et al., 1996), we set an alpha-level of .01 for 
model fit tests and an alpha-level of .05 for all other analyses. 
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7.3. Participants 
Participants consisted of 80 healthy community-dwelling older adults (aged 65 
and over; Mage = 71.40, range = 65 to 87, 51 female). Two additional participants were 
excluded, one due to difficulty responding to the numerical memory judgment questions 
in metric units and the other due to difficulty following instructions in the cognitive load 
condition. All participants met the inclusion criteria detailed on p. 26 of Experiment 1. 
Demographic and health characteristics of the sample can be found in Table 7.3. All 
participants received at least a score of 25 on the MMSE (Folstein, et al., 1975, M = 
29.16, SD = 1.11). Participants were recruited through newspaper advertisements and 
flyers in the Metro Vancouver area and received $20 to compensate for their time and 
travel costs.   
Table 7.3.     Demographic and Health Characteristics of Participants (n = 80) 
Characteristics Mean (SD) 
Age  71.4 (5.0) 
     Range 65-87 
Gender (% female) 63.4 
Ethnicity (%)  
     Caucasian 87.8 
     East Asian 6.1 
     South Asian 2.4 
     Other 3.6 
ESL (%) 17.1 
Education  14.5 (2.2) 
Cardiovascular risks (% diagnosed)  
     Hypertension 41.5 
     Type 2 diabetes  8.5 
     High cholesterol  36.6 
     Cardiovascular disease 15.9 
     Previous heart attack 6.1 
Smoking Status (%)  
     Currently 6.1 
     Never 40.2 
Alcohol Use (%) 69.5 
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7.4. Measures 
The following measures were administered and scored by trained research 
assistants following manualized procedures. All study protocols were approved by the 
Simon Fraser University research ethics board prior to administration. 
7.4.1. Memory Judgment HB Task 
Participants completed a computerized memory judgment task consisting of 60 
questions adopted from Experiment 1, Bayen et al. (2006), and Bernstein et al. (2011a). 
We used a within-subject repeated measures design consisting of a control condition, 
standard experimental condition, and cognitive load condition. The control and standard 
experimental conditions were the same as those used in Experiment 1, and in most HB 
studies involving trivia questions (e.g., Hell et al., 1988). The control condition provided a 
baseline for the standard experimental and cognitive load conditions.   
The OJ phase was identical across conditions. Each of the 60 questions 
appeared separately on a computer screen. The order of the questions was randomized 
for each participant. Participants typed their numerical OJs at their own pace, the digits 
appearing on screen as participants typed. After completing other cognitive measures for 
90-minutes, the ROJ phase commenced, which consisted of the 60 questions from the 
OJ phase, presented in a new randomized order. Participants completed 20 questions in 
each condition (control, standard experimental, and cognitive load). Questions were 
randomly assigned to conditions, and the order in which participants completed the three 
conditions was randomized for each participant.5 Prior to commencing each block, 
participants completed a practice question to ensure they understood the task. 
The ROJ phase differed across conditions. In the control condition, the CJs were 
not presented during the ROJ. One question appeared on each screen and participants 
were prompted to respond with their original answer, as follows:  
 
5
 We tested for condition order effects on the unconstrained parameter estimates and found no 
significant differences across condition orders. 
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How long is the Rhine River (in kilometres)?  
What was your original answer?   
_______________________ 
Participants received the following verbal and written instructions: “You will be presented 
with some of the questions that you completed at the very start of the study today. We 
are interested in how well people remember their own answers to earlier questions. 
Please try to answer the questions with the same answers you gave the first time you 
answered them.” 
In the standard experimental condition the CJ appeared during the ROJ. One 
question and the corresponding correct answer were presented per screen, and 
participants were prompted to respond with their original answer:  
How long is the Rhine River (in kilometres)?  
The Rhine River is 1320 kilometers.   
What was your original answer?  
_______________________ 
Participants received the following verbal and written instructions: “You will be presented 
with some of the questions that you completed at the very start of the study today along 
with the correct answers to these questions. We are interested in how well people 
remember their own answers to earlier questions. Please read the correct answer and 
then try to answer the question with the same answer you gave earlier today.” 
In the cognitive load condition the CJ appeared immediately before the ROJ to 
each question. We administered the first CJ test prior to each ROJ to ensure that 
participants were attending to and processing this information. We administered the 
second CJ test after each ROJ to assess the degree to which individuals were able to 
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rehearse this information in working memory during the ROJ.6 Thus, items in the 
cognitive load condition appeared as follows:  
The Rhine River is 1320 kilometres long. 
After 10 seconds, the above screen changed and participants were prompted to recall 
the CJ:  
How long is the Rhine River (in kilometres)?  
What is the correct answer?  
_______________________ 
The next screen prompted participants to recall their original answer: 
How long is the Rhine River?  
What was your original answer? 
_______________________km 
Finally, the last screen prompted participants to recall the correct answer a second time:  
How long is the Rhine River? 
What is the correct answer?  
_______________________km 
Participants received the following verbal and written instructions: “You will be presented 
with some of the correct answers to the questions you responded to earlier today. Each 
correct answer will be presented on the screen for 10 seconds. Please use this time to 
study the answers.  After the correct answer disappears, on the following screens, you 
will be asked to recall the CORRECT answer, followed by your ORIGINAL answer, and 
then the CORRECT answer a second time. When providing your original answers to the 
questions, please try to ignore the correct answers and respond with the answers you 
gave at the start of the study.” 
 
6
 Initially, we only included the second RCJ test (i.e. after each ROJ); however, based on our pilot 
data, we added the first RCJ test (i.e., prior to each ROJ) to ensure that participants were 
attending to the CJ and to increase accuracy rates on the second RCJ test. 
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7.4.2. Cognitive Ability Measures 
 We used the same cognitive tests as Experiment 1 to assess inhibitory control 
(Color-Word Interference test of the D-KEFS; Delis et al., 2001), episodic memory (long 
delay free recall trial of the CVLT-2; Delis et al., 2000), and working memory capacity 
(Backward Digit Span and Letter-Number Sequencing composite of the WAIS-III; 
Wechsler, 1997). Please refer to Section 3.6 for a description of these measures and 
their psychometric properties. Table 7.4.2 presents the mean scores on the cognitive 
ability measures. Note that higher scores on the inhibition test reflect lower inhibitory 
control (increased latencies), while higher scores on the episodic memory and working 
memory tests reflect stronger memory. As expected, performance on the cognitive ability 
tests were significantly associated in the expected directions, with correlations ranging in 
size from small to moderate (r = .27 - .44, ps < .02). 
Table 7.4.2.     Performance on Cognitive Ability Tests 
Cognitive Ability Test Cognitive Ability  
Raw Score 
Mean (SD) 
Scaled Score        
Mean (SD) 
D-KEFS: Color-Word 
Interference – Color Naminga 
Speed 32.21 (5.13) 10.43 (2.10) 
D-KEFS: Color-Word 
Interference - Inhibitiona 
Inhibitory Control 64.72 (15.87) 11.29 (2.35) 
D-KEFS: Color-Word 
Interference - Contrasta 
Inhibitory Control  
(no speed) 
32.51 (13.54) 10.86 (2.19) 
CVLT-II: Long Delay Free 
Recall - Words Recalledb 
Episodic Memory 9.22 (3.50) 10.03 (2.89) 
WAIS-III: Backward Digit Span 
- Strings Recalledb 
Working Memory  6.70 (2.05) -- 
WAIS-III: Letter-Number 
Sequencing - Strings Recalledb 
Working Memory  9.59 (2.35) 11.32 (2.54) 
Note. D-KEFS = Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (Delis et al., 2001); CVLT-II = 
California Verbal Learning Test-2 (Delis et al., 2000); WAIS-III = Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-III (Wechsler, 1997). aHigher scores reflect poorer performance;  
bHigher scores reflect better performance. Scaled scores have a mean of 10 and a 
standard deviation of 3. The Backward Digit Span subtest represents only one 
component of the WAIS-IV Digit Span test and thus standard scores are not available. 
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7.5. Procedures 
Trained research assistants tested participants individually in a single 2.5-h 
session at the Simon Fraser University Cognitive Aging Laboratory. The session began 
with the OJ questionnaire of the memory judgment HB task. Following the OJ 
questionnaire, participants completed the battery of cognitive tests, which lasted 
approximately 90-min. Following this retention period, participants completed the ROJ 
questionnaire. Completion of both the OJ and the ROJ questionnaire was self-paced; 
participants took 15-30 min to complete the OJ questionnaire and 30-45-min to complete 
the ROJ questionnaire. Participants took brief rest breaks as needed. 
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Chapter 8.  
 
Results 
8.1. Goodness-of-Fit of the Unconstrained HB19 Model with 
Respect to the General Multinomial Model 
Our first statistical test concerned the fit of the unconstrained HB19 model to the 
probabilities of the observed HB data for each of the n individuals. This involved testing 
the unconstrained HB19 model against the general multinomial model for 3 · 10 data 
categories and n individuals using parametric bootstrapping. The unconstrained HB19 
model has 19 · 80 = 1,520 parameters, and the general multinomial model has 27 · 80 = 
2,160 parameters. Thus, the goodness-of-fit test comparing the general multinomial 
model against the unconstrained HB19 model has 2,160 – 1,520 = 640 degrees of 
freedom. With an alpha-level of .01, N = 4,750 (80 participants · 60 items – 50 missing 
responses), and df = 640, we had adequate power (>.99) to detect moderate deviations 
(w = .3) from the general multinomial model but insufficient power (.16) to detect small 
deviations (w = .1).7 On the basis of 500 bootstrapped samples, we initially failed to find 
an acceptable model fit, ∆G2(640) = 684.45, pb = .002. We identified one item that had a 
disproportionately high number of observations in the ROJ = OJ < CJ category relative 
to the ROJ = OJ > CJ category and two items that had a disproportionately high number 
of observations in the CJ < ROJ < OJ relative to the OJ < ROJ < CJ category. Thus, 
these three items violated the symmetry assumptions of the model. After excluding these 
problematic items, the remaining data set consisted of 57 items and had an acceptable 
model fit, ∆G2(640) = 657.17, pb = .02. 
 
7
 Power analyses were computed with the G*Power3 program (Faul et al., 2007). 
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8.2. Simplification of the Unconstrained HB 19 Model 
To determine whether we could simplify the unconstrained HB19 model we first 
tested for heterogeneity in each of the ancillary parameters. Of the nine ancillary 
parameters, three (gl3, gg3, and lE) are unique to the experimental tree. Thus, we 
conducted a total of 12 ancillary heterogeneity tests. Each test involved comparing the 
unconstrained HB19 model (1,520 parameters) against a null model in which the 
parameter of interest was a constant and the remaining 18 parameters were 
unconstrained. Thus, each null model has 18 · 80 + 1 = 1,441 parameters. The 
goodness-of-fit tests comparing the unconstrained HB19 model against each of the null 
models have 1,520 – 1,441 = 79 degrees of freedom. With an alpha-level of .05, N = 
4,510 (80 participants · 57 items – 50 missing responses), and df = 79, we had high 
power (>.99) to detect moderate deviations (w = .3) from the general multinomial model, 
but only moderate power (.75) to detect small deviations (w = .1). 
Table 8.2 depicts the results of these heterogeneity tests as well as summary 
statistics on these parameters. On the basis of 100 bootstrapped samples, we rejected 
the null model that the ancillary parameter was a constant for all but three of the 12 
ancillary parameters. The three parameters that we modeled as being equal across 
individuals were g12k, gg3Lk, and gg3Lk. Whereas parameter gl2 affects the distribution of 
unbiased OJ reconstructions and represents the probability of reconstructing ROJs that 
deviate from the CJ in the direction of the OJ, parameters gg3 and gg3L affect the 
distribution of biased OJ reconstructions and represent probabilities of reconstructing 
ROJs that deviate from the OJ in the direction of the CJ. The remaining nine ancillary 
parameters were left unconstrained and free to vary across individuals in subsequent 
models. 
With regard to the core parameters, we rejected the null models that parameters 
rCSk, rESk, cSk, bLk, rELk, and cLk were equal across individuals. Hence, in contrast to 
Experiment 1, we also found significant heterogeneity in CJ adoptions as measured by 
cSk and cLk, possibly due to the added complexity of the memory judgment task. Although 
there was significant heterogeneity in reconstruction bias in the cognitive load condition, 
we failed to reject the null model for parameter bSk; however, the bootstrapped p-value 
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was approaching significance (pb = .12). This latter finding does not necessarily imply 
that there is no heterogeneity in this parameter, but rather, that the parameter can be 
modeled equally well as a constant than as an unconstrained parameter. If the cognitive 
abilities contribute to reconstruction bias, then we may improve estimation of this 
parameter using logistic functions of the cognitive covariates as opposed to a constant. 
To allow for this possibility and to assess the role of the cognitive covariates in 
reconstruction bias, we modeled all of the core parameters (including bSk) as logistic 
functions of the cognitive covariates in our final logistic HB19 model. 
Table 8.2.    Heterogeneity Tests of the HB19 Parameters  
Parameter     Mean                SD ΔG2 pb 
Ancillary Parameters     
gl1k .85 .16 127.38 <.001 
gg1k .81 .17 131.47 <.001 
gl2k .54 .22 96.24 .13 
gg2k .53 .23 124.39 <.001 
lCk .45 .12 160.01 <.001 
hk .01 .04 56.35 <.001 
gl3Sk .68 .35 89.16 .04 
gg3Sk .67 .31 90.44 .24 
lESk .47 .12 184.28 <.001 
gl3Lk .60 .36 98.21 .04 
gg3Lk .66 .35 99.50 .14 
lElk .45 .12 106.13 .03 
Core Parameters     
bSk .53 .26 97.95 .12  
rCk .27 .17 226.24 <.001 
rESk .24 .15 204.14 <.001 
cSk .04 .12 19.19 .04 
bLk .57 .26 119.30 <.001 
rElk .21 .15 219.25 <.001 
cLk .07 .14 155.64 <.001 
Note. The means and standard deviations are based on the unconstrained HB19 model. 
The ∆G2 statistics represent the model tests comparing the unconstrained HB19 model 
to a null model in which the parameter of interest was a constant and the remaining 18 
parameters were unconstrained. The p-values (denoted pb) are based on 100 
bootstrapped samples.   
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On the basis of the results of these heterogeneity tests, we defined the simplified 
HB19 model as follows: With the exception of parameters gl2k, gg3Sk, and gg3Lk, all the 
ancillary and core parameters were unconstrained across individuals. Parameters gl2Sk, 
gg3Sk, and gg3Lk were constrained to be equal across individuals. The simplified model has 
S · n + z parameters, where S denotes the number of unconstrained parameters and z 
denotes the number of parameters that were simplified to constants. Thus, the simplified 
HB19 model has 16 · 80 + 3 = 1,283 parameters. With an alpha-level of .01, N = 4,510, 
and df = 237, we had adequate power (>.99) to detect moderate deviations (w = .3) from 
the unconstrained HB19 model, but insufficient power (.36) to detect small deviations (w 
= .1). As expected, on the basis of 500 bootstrapped samples the simplified HB19 model 
had an acceptable model fit, ∆G2(237) = 287.317, pb = .96. 
8.3. Logistic HB19 Model 
We then introduced the logistic HB19 model by replacing the core parameters 
rCk, bSk, rESk, cSk, bLk, rELk, and cLk of the simplified HB19 model with logistic functions of 
inhibition, episodic memory, and working memory capacity, respectively. To capture 
potential additive effects we allowed the intercept terms to vary across experimental 
conditions by including additional intercept terms in the logistic functions of the core 
parameters in the cognitive load condition. For example, parameter bSk was represented 
by αb1 and parameter bLk was represented by the sum of αb1 and αb2, such that αb2 
represents the additive effect of the manipulation on reconstruction bias. Similarly, to test 
for interaction effects we included additional beta terms in the logistic functions of the 
core parameters in the cognitive load condition. For example, the inhibition term in bSk 
was represented by βb1 and the inhibition term in bLk was represented by the sum of 
βb1+βb4, such that βb4 represents the interaction between the manipulation and inhibition 
on reconstruction bias. Thus, the logistic functions for parameters rCk, rEk, bk, and ck 
were: 
rCSk = 
exp(αrC1+𝛽rC1Inhibition𝑘+𝛽rC2Memory𝑘+𝛽rC3Working⁡Memory𝑘)
(1+exp(αrC1+𝛽rC1Inhibition𝑘+𝛽rC2Memory𝑘+𝛽rC3Working⁡Memory𝑘⁡))
 
rESk = 
exp(αrE1+𝛽rE1Inhibition𝑘+𝛽rE2Memory𝑘+𝛽rE3Working⁡Memory𝑘⁡)
(1+exp(αrE1+𝛽rE1Inhibition𝑘+𝛽rE2Memory𝑘+𝛽rE3Working⁡Memory𝑘⁡))
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rELk =⁡
exp((αrE1+αrE2)+(𝛽rE1+𝛽rE4)Inhibition𝑘+(𝛽rE2+𝛽rE5)Memory𝑘+(𝛽rE3+𝛽rE6)Working⁡Memory𝑘)
(1+exp((αrE1+αrE2)+(𝛽rE1+𝛽rE4)Inhibition𝑘+(𝛽rE2+𝛽rE5)Memory𝑘+(𝛽rE3+𝛽rE6)Working⁡Memory𝑘))
 
bSk = 
exp(αb1+𝛽b1Inhibition𝑘+𝛽rb2Memory𝑘+𝛽rb3Working⁡Memory𝑘⁡⁡)
(1+exp(αb1+𝛽b1Inhibition𝑘+𝛽rb2Memory𝑘+𝛽rb3Working⁡Memory𝑘⁡))
 
bLk =⁡
exp((αb1+αb2)+(𝛽b1+𝛽b4)Inhibition𝑘+(𝛽rb2+𝛽rb5)Memory𝑘+(𝛽rb3+𝛽rb6)Working⁡Memory𝑘)
(1+exp((αb1+αb2)+(𝛽b1+𝛽b4)Inhibition𝑘+(𝛽rb2+𝛽rE5)Memory𝑘+(𝛽rb3+𝛽rb6)Working⁡Memory𝑘))
  
cSk =⁡
exp(αc1+𝛽c1Inhibition𝑘+𝛽c2Memory𝑘+𝛽c3Working⁡Memory𝑘⁡)
(1+𝑒xp(αc1+𝛽c1Inhibition𝑘+𝛽c2Memory𝑘+𝛽c3Working⁡Memory𝑘))
 
cLk=
exp((αc1+αc2)+(𝛽c1+𝛽c4)Inhibition𝑘+(𝛽rc2+𝛽rc5)Memory𝑘+(𝛽rc3+𝛽rc6)Working⁡Memory𝑘)
(1+exp((αc1+αc2)+(𝛽c1+𝛽c4)Inhibition𝑘+(𝛽rc2+𝛽rc5)Memory𝑘+(𝛽rc3+𝛽rc6)Working⁡Memory𝑘))
      (12)   
The logistic HB19 model has S · n + (7 · (C + 1)) + z parameters, where S is the 
number of unconstrained HB19 parameters that may vary freely between individuals, C 
is the number of cognitive variables in each core parameter function, the 1 accounts for 
the constant terms in each bias function, and z is the number of parameters that were 
simplified to a constant. Thus, the number of parameters in our logistic HB19 model is 9 
· 80 + (7 · (3 + 1)) + 3 = 751. 
8.4. Model Selection 
We compared the previously described four candidate models (general 
multinomial, unconstrained HB19, simplified HB19, and logistic HB19) to identify which 
model provides the best approximation of the true model underlying our data. The AIC 
values and Akaike weights for each of the models are shown in Table 8.4. The model 
associated with the smallest AIC value and the highest Akaike weight was the logistic 
HB19 model. Consistent with findings from our prior work, the probability estimate that 
the logistic HB19 model was the best of our four candidate models was very close to 1. 
Furthermore, the AIC values decreased with each model introduced, indicating that the 
models became progressively better in terms of the compromise between descriptive 
accuracy and parsimony as we progressed through our model hierarchy. 
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Table 8.4.    AIC Values and Akaike Weights for the Four Candidate HB Models  
Model         AICq            Δq(AIC)            wq (AIC) 
General Multinomial 20,004 952 
329 
144 
0 
<.001 
<.001 
<.001 
>.99 
Unconstrained HB19 19,381 
19,196 
19,052 
Simplified HB19 
Logistic HB19 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; Δq (AIC) = [AICi – min(AIC)]; wi (AIC) = rounded 
Akaike weights interpreted as the probability that Model q is the best model given the 
dataset and set of candidate models. 
8.5. Cognitive Covariate Hypothesis Testing 
Using the logistic HB19 model, we tested our hypotheses regarding the role of 
the cognitive abilities in the underlying HB processes. This analysis involved 
bootstrapping the 95% confidence intervals for the beta coefficients on each cognitive 
covariate for each of the core parameters.8 As is shown in Table 8.5, our analyses 
revealed that inhibition was the only significant predictor of rCk, β = -0.19, 95% CI =        
[-0.35, -0.03], pb = .004, and rESk, β = -0.27, 95% CI = [-0.42, -0.13], pb < .001: One 
standard deviation increase in inhibition latency scores was associated with a 3.3% 
decrease in mean recollection rates in the control condition, and a 4.3% decrease in 
mean recollection rates in the standard experimental condition. Finally, both inhibition, β 
= 0.24, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.36], pb = .04, and working memory capacity, β = 0.29, 95% CI 
= [0.002, 0.47], pb = .047, were significant predictors of bSk: One standard deviation 
increase in inhibition latency scores was associated with a 6.0% increase, and one 
standard deviation increase in working memory scores was associated with a 7.2% 
increase in mean reconstruction bias in the standard experimental condition. None of the 
cognitive covariates significantly predicted CJ adoptions (parameter CSk). For the 
cognitive load parameters, only one significant finding emerged: Inhibition was a 
significant predictor of rELk, β = -0.39, 95% CI = [-0.59, -0.25], pb < .001, such that one 
 
8
 The reported results remain the same when using asymptotic ΔG
2
 tests. 
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standard deviation increase in inhibition scores was associated with a 5.4% decrease in 
mean estimated recollection rates in the cognitive load condition. 
In sum, consistent with Experiment 1, individuals with higher inhibitory control 
were more likely to recollect their OJs in the absence and presence of the CJ and were 
less likely to show reconstruction bias in the standard experimental condition.  
Interestingly, individuals with higher working memory capacity were somewhat more 
likely to show reconstruction bias in the standard experimental condition. With the 
exception of lower inhibitory control significantly predicting lower recollection rates, the 
lack of significant main effects of the covariates in the cognitive load condition suggests 
potential interaction effects between the manipulation and cognitive ability, which we 
formally test in the next section. 
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Table 8.5.     Model Tests for the Logistic HB19 Model 
Cognitive Function Coefficient pb(two-tailed) 
Recollection: Control (rCk)    
αC0 -1.13  
βC1 (Inhibition) -0.19 .004 
βC2 (Episodic Memory) 0.04 .62 
βC3 (Working Memory) 0.02 .73 
Recollection: Standard Experimental (rESk)   
αES0 -1.28  
βES1 (Inhibition) -0.27 <.001 
βES2 (Episodic Memory) -0.01 .80 
βES3 (Working Memory) -0.02 .89 
Reconstruction Bias: Standard Experimental (bSk) 
αbS0 -0.16  
βbS1 (Inhibition) 0.24 .04 
βbS2 (Episodic Memory) -0.17 .27 
βbS3 (Working Memory) 0.29 .047 
CJ Adoptions: Standard Experimental (cSk) 
αcS0 -19.68  
βcS1 (Inhibition) -0.44 .99 
βcS2 (Episodic Memory) -0.31 .96 
βcS3 (Working Memory) 0.76 .99 
Recollection: Cognitive Load (rELk) 
αEL0 -1.45  
βEL1 (Inhibition) -0.39 <.001 
βEL2 (Episodic Memory) -0.11 .16 
βEL3 (Working Memory) -0.03 .68 
Reconstruction Bias: Cognitive Load (bLk) 
αbL0 -0.03  
βbL1 (Inhibition) -0.17 .15 
βbL2 (Episodic Memory) -0.10 .46 
βbL3 (Working Memory) 0.13 .38 
CJ Adoptions: Cognitive Load (cLk)  
αcL0 -3.10  
βcL1 (Inhibition) 0.10 .98 
βcL2 (Episodic Memory) -0.12 .53 
βcL3 (Working Memory) -0.17 .66 
Note. The p-values (denoted pb) are based on bootstrapping the 95% confidence 
intervals for the beta coefficients on each cognitive covariate for each parameter.  
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8.6. Additive and Interactive Manipulation Effects in the 
Logistic HB19 Model  
8.6.1. Manipulation Check 
 Prior to assessing the effects of our manipulation, we first examined whether 
participants engaged in the manipulation. We wanted to ensure that participants were 
not strategically ignoring the CJ and focusing solely on recalling their OJ. This would be 
problematic because the manipulation works on the assumption that participants are 
actively rehearsing the CJ during ROJ generation. To assess this, we used the two 
recall-of-the-CJ measures (i.e., RCJ1 and RCJ2) as indicators of CJ accessibility. Our 
findings revealed that, on average, participants recalled 96% of the CJs on RCJ1 and 
90% of the CJs on RCJ2. Furthermore, the average relative deviation of the RCJ from 
the CJ was only 1.5% on RCJ1 and 3.0% on RCJ2, indicating that incorrectly recalled 
estimates were close to the CJs (e.g., partial memory for the CJ). In sum, the high RCJ 
rates along with the small deviation scores indicate that participants actively processed 
the CJs and were quite successful at holding this information in working memory 
throughout ROJ generation. By design, this should increase the inhibition demands and 
make it more difficult to suppress the CJ during ROJ. 
8.6.2. Additive and Interactive Manipulation Effects 
Next, we used the logistic HB19 model to test our primary hypotheses regarding 
the effects of the manipulation on the underlying HB processes. We predicted that the 
manipulation would have an overall effect on the parameters (decrease rE; increase b 
and c), but we also considered whether the effect of the manipulation varied across 
individuals as a function of cognitive ability. This analysis involved bootstrapping the 
95% confidence intervals for the additional intercept (α2) and beta (β4, βb5, βb6) terms for 
each of the core parameters (see Eq. 12).  
As is shown in Table 8.6.2, the intercept for parameter rEk was significantly larger 
(i.e., more negative) in the cognitive load condition than in the standard experimental 
condition, indicating that cognitive load uniformly decreased OJ recollection probabilities 
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across individuals. Specifically, the average recollection probability for cognitive load 
items (rEL = .19) was 3% lower than the average recollection probability for standard 
experimental items (rES = .22). Because the average recollection probability for control 
items remains stable as our baseline condition (rC = .24), this indicates that, on average, 
cognitive load increased recollection bias by 3%, which is more than double the 
estimated recollection bias in the standard condition. There were no significant additive 
effects of the manipulation on reconstruction bias and CJ adoptions. 
Although cognitive load did not have an overall effect on reconstruction bias, our 
findings revealed that the interaction between the effect of the manipulation and 
inhibition ability on reconstruction bias was approaching significance (interactive effect = 
-0.41, pb = .059). Figure 8.6.2 depicts estimated reconstruction bias as a function of 
inhibition scores, with higher inhibition scores reflecting increased latencies and thus 
lower inhibitory control. The upward sloping line indicates that lower inhibitory control 
was associated with higher reconstruction bias in the standard experimental condition. 
This relationship was significant (β = 0.24, pb = .04). Conversely, the downward sloping 
line suggests that lower inhibitory control was associated with lower reconstruction bias 
in the cognitive load condition. However, this relationship was not significant (β = -0.17, 
pb = .15) and thus the downward slope of the line is not different from 0 (i.e., flat line). 
The two sets of dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals around predicted 
reconstruction bias in the standard experimental (···) and cognitive load (~·~·) 
conditions. Examination of where these two sets of confidence intervals cross indicates 
that the manipulation significantly increased reconstruction bias, but only in individuals 
with high inhibitory control (i.e., inhibition latency scores at least 0.5 SDs below the 
mean). Thus, it appears that cognitive load equalized the available processing resources 
of individuals with high vs. low inhibitory ability, resulting in individuals with high 
inhibitory ability performing more similarly to individuals with low inhibitory ability. There 
were no other significant interaction effects. 
Given that the bootstrapped p-value for the critical interaction term did not quite 
meet our a priori criteria (α < .05) for statistical significance, we conducted additional 
analyses to further test the reliability of this finding. Specifically, we conducted an 
asymptotic chi-square test and ΔAIC analyses based on comparing the alternative 
logistic HB19 model to a null model that is identical to the logistic HB19 model with the 
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exception of the interaction effect being set to 0. The asymptotic chi-square test was 
significant at p = .01 and the AIC of the alternative logistic HB19 model provided a better 
account of the data in terms of minimizing the expected information loss and the 
compromise between descriptive accuracy and parsimony (ΔAIC = 4.4). Thus, our ability 
to capture the observed HB data improves when we include the interaction term in the 
model, providing further support for the importance and reliability of this finding. 
 
Table 8.6.2.     Additive (Intercept) and Interactive (Beta) Manipulation Effects  
Parameter Standard 
Experimental 
Cognitive  
Load 
Difference pb 
(two-tailed) 
Intercept Tests (Additive Effect) 
bk -0.16 -0.03  0.13  .91 
rEk -1.28 -1.45 -0.17  .02 
ck -19.68 -3.10 16.57  .96 
Beta Tests (Interactive Effect) 
Parameter bk     
Inhibition  0.24 -0.17 -0.41  .06 
Episodic Memory -0.17 -0.10  0.07  .82 
Working Memory  0.29  0.13 -0.16  .62 
Parameter rEk     
Inhibition -0.27 -0.39 -0.12  .65 
Episodic Memory -0.01 -0.11 -0.10  .66 
Working Memory -0.02 -0.03 -0.01  .72 
Parameter ck     
Inhibition -0.44  0.10  0.54  .48 
Episodic Memory -0.31 -0.12  0.19 >.99 
Working Memory  0.76 -0.17 -0.94  .74 
Note.  The intercept and beta manipulation tests are based on the logistic HB19 model. 
The p-values (denoted pb) are based on 500 bootstrapped samples. A significant pb-
value indicates that the intercept/beta coefficient significantly varied across conditions. 
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Figure 8.6.2.  The Interactive Effect of the Manipulation and Inhibition on 
Reconstruction Bias. The figure depicts the predicted reconstruction bias (y-axis) by 
individual sorted by inhibition scores (x-axis) holding constant individuals’ working 
memory and episodic memory scores. High inhibition scores represent high response 
latencies and thus low inhibitory control. The two sets of dashed lines represent the 95% 
confidence intervals around predicted reconstruction bias in the standard experimental 
condition (···) and the cognitive load condition (~·~·) from the logistic HB19 model. 
 
bSk: β = 0.24, 
pb = .04 
bLk: β = -0.17, 
pb = .15 
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Chapter 9.  
 
 
Discussion 
We conducted an experimental manipulation study to empirically test whether 
inhibitory control underlies older adults’ recollection and reconstruction biases. Our 
findings revealed that cognitive load (1) uniformly decreased recollection rates in the 
presence of the CJ, thereby increasing recollection bias and (2) increased reconstruction 
bias, but only for individuals with higher inhibitory control. These findings replicate and 
extend those of Experiment 1. For example, the findings from the logistic HB19 model 
were quite similar to those of the logistic HB13 model, which supports the robustness of 
this approach in determining individual differences in HB. In addition, our finding that 
directly manipulating inhibitory control disrupts HB in older adults is an important and 
novel extension of Experiment 1. Prior to this, only associations among inhibitory control 
and the underlying HB processes had been established. Thus, a major contribution of 
this experiment was to provide a direct test of inhibitory control in older adults’ 
recollection and reconstruction biases using a within-subjects experimental manipulation 
of inhibition. Moreover, we are the first to assess individual differences in how cognitive 
load affects HB performance. This is an important contribution that identifies whether 
individuals with high or low cognitive functioning are particularly vulnerable to HB in 
situations where their attention is divided between multiple activities, as is often the case 
in the real world. 
Our additive manipulation tests revealed that, on average, cognitive load as 
implemented decreased older adults’ recollection rates for experimental items (rE) by 
3%. Because the recollection probability for control items (rC) is a stable baseline 
condition, this indicates that cognitive load increased recollection bias by 3%. Although 
this effect may appear trivial, it is quite significant given that recollection bias is typically 
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small in younger adults (e.g., Dehn & Erdfelder, 1998; Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998) and 
prior work has documented an average recollection bias estimate of only 3% (Erdfelder 
et al., 2007). Thus, cognitive load doubled the typical recollection bias effect, suggesting 
that inhibitory control is an important contributor to recollection bias. Importantly, this 
finding applied to individuals with low and high cognitive functioning, suggesting an 
overall negative effect of cognitive load on recollection bias independent of cognitive 
functioning. 
With regard to reconstruction bias, our experimental manipulation of inhibition did 
not have an overall effect on older adults’ reconstruction bias (additive effect = .13, pb = 
.91). Rather, interaction tests revealed that the effect of cognitive load on reconstruction 
bias varied as a function of inhibitory control, such that individuals with higher inhibitory 
control were more effected by cognitive load than those with lower inhibitory control 
(interactive effect = -0.41, pb = .059). When testing this effect using parametric 
bootstrapping, the effect did not quite reach the conventional standards for statistical 
significance; however, further investigations (e.g., asymptotic chi-square test and ΔAIC) 
supported the importance and reliability of the effect. Nevertheless, given the novelty of 
this finding, replication is warranted. 
One explanation for the interaction effect is that higher functioning individuals are 
not used to having suppressed inhibitory capacities and thus have not acquired 
strategies to cope with the additional load. This explanation is consistent with the theory 
that cognitive load equalizes available processing resources among individuals with high 
and low cognitive ability. Most likely, individuals with lower inhibitory control were unable 
to suppress the CJ in the standard experimental condition. Thus, when under cognitive 
load they simply remained incapable of suppressing the CJ. Conversely, individuals with 
higher inhibitory control were able to use their abilities to suppress the CJ in the 
standard experimental condition.  However, under cognitive load, these individuals were 
incapable of suppressing the CJ and thus performed more similarly to individuals with 
lower inhibitory control. This is a unique finding that suggests that that even high 
functioning individuals are susceptible to HB when their cognitive resources are taxed, 
which is likely the norm in everyday situations where HB may arise. 
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With regard to the associations among cognitive abilities and the underlying HB 
processes, our findings were quite similar to those of Experiment 1. For example in both 
experiments, older adults with higher inhibitory control had higher recollection ability and 
lower reconstruction bias. However, there were a couple of notable differences across 
experiments. First, in contrast to Experiment 1, episodic memory did not predict 
recollection ability. Rather, lower inhibitory control was associated with lower recollection 
rates for both control and experimental items, suggesting that learning the CJs to 
experimental items influenced ROJs to control items. Erdfelder et al. (2007) termed this 
generalized interference effects. For example, learning the CJ to the experimental item, 
“How long is the Nile River?” may interfere with the OJ memory trace to the control item, 
“How long is the Amazon River?” Inhibiting the CJs of experimental items would 
minimize generalized interference, leading to higher OJ recollection across item 
conditions. While findings from Experiment 2 support this explanation, in Experiment 1, 
we found that inhibitory control predicted recollection rates for experimental but not 
control items. This discrepancy may be accounted for by differences in feedback set size 
(i.e., number of CJs presented) across experiments: the feedback set was 27 (50% of 
items) in Experiment 1 and 40 (67% of items) in Experiment 2. Given that generalized 
interference increases with feedback set size (Erdfelder et al., 2007), the larger feedback 
set likely increased generalized interference in Experiment 2.   
Second, in addition to higher inhibitory control predicting less reconstruction bias, 
we also found that higher working memory capacity predicted more reconstruction bias. 
A similar result, though not statistically significant, emerged in Experiment 1. Other 
researchers investigating the role of working memory capacity in HB have found mixed 
results: Calvillo (2012, 2014) used a memory design and found that higher working 
memory capacity was associated with less HB; Nestler, Blank, and von Collani (2008) 
used a hypothetical design and found that higher working memory capacity was 
associated with more HB. Whereas the memory design requires participants to make a 
naïve prediction and then recall this prediction after learning the actual outcome, the 
hypothetical design involves participants learning the actual outcome and then 
generating an estimate of what they would have predicted without the benefit of outcome 
knowledge. Although a sense-making process is presumed to underlie HB in the 
hypothetical design (Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007; Roese & Vohs, 2012), sense-making may 
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also be initiated in the memory design conditional on a failed OJ recollection. If the OJ is 
not accessible, then individuals may attempt to make sense of the outcome by searching 
for viable explanations. As in the hypothetical design, the CJ can bias this search of 
long-term memory by eliciting outcome congruent explanations. This is an effortful, 
analytical process that requires working memory resources. Thus, individuals with higher 
working memory capacity may be more likely to engage in sense-making, resulting in a 
biased, but sensible reconstruction of their OJ. However, because this explanation is 
inconsistent with Calvillo's findings, the role of working memory in the underlying HB 
processes requires further investigation.  
A limitation of this experiment, and of experimental manipulation paradigms more 
generally, is that we do not have perfect control over the cognitive ability that we are 
interested in isolating through our manipulation. That is, it is difficult to design a process-
pure manipulation that targets the cognitive ability of interest, but not other related 
abilities (Dunn & Kirsner, 1989; Jacoby, 1991). Designing process-pure tasks and 
manipulations is a well-known, central challenge of dual-task studies, as well as 
neuroimaging studies of localization (Aguirre, 2011). Although our manipulation may not 
be process-pure in the strict sense, we specifically designed it to maximize CJ inhibition 
demands during ROJ generation. We, therefore, believe that our manipulation primarily 
targeted inhibitory control. Furthermore, we now have converging evidence using two 
different experimental methods (i.e., logistic regression and experimental manipulation) 
that inhibitory control plays an important role in the underlying HB processes. 
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Chapter 10.  
 
General Discussion 
We asked participants to answer trivia questions, and later asked them to recall 
their original answers in the absence (control condition) or presence (standard 
experimental condition) of the correct answer to each question. In Experiment 2, in 
addition to the above conditions, participants completed a cognitive load condition, 
where they were required to rehearse the correct answer while recalling their original 
answer. In Experiment 1, we assessed the associations among various cognitive abilities 
and the underlying recollection and reconstruction processes that contribute to HB. In 
Experiment 2, we directly assessed the impact of inhibition on recollection and 
reconstruction biases by experimentally manipulating inhibition demands during the HB 
task. Our findings revealed that (1) lower episodic memory was associated with lower 
recollection ability in the absence of outcome information (Exp. 1), (2) lower episodic 
memory and inhibitory control was each associated with lower recollection ability in the 
presence of outcome information (Exp. 1), (3) lower inhibitory control was associated 
with higher reconstruction bias (Exp. 1), (4) outcome rehearsal during ROJ uniformly 
increased recollection bias (Exp. 2), and (5) outcome rehearsal during ROJ increased 
reconstruction bias but only for individuals with higher inhibitory control (Exp. 2). Taken 
together, our findings indicate that inhibitory control is an important modifier of HB in 
older adults: In the recollection stage, inhibitory control is needed to minimize 
interference effects of the CJ on recall of one’s OJ. In the reconstruction stage, inhibitory 
control is needed to suppress the CJ and engage in an unbiased reconstruction of one’s 
forgotten OJ. 
Our findings offer several novel contributions to the HB and MPT literatures. 
First, while prior work has identified a link between cognitive abilities and older adults’ 
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HB, we extend this work by disentangling the complex relationship between cognitive 
abilities and the underlying recollection and reconstruction processes. Second, we are 
the first to assess for individual differences in how cognitive load affects the underlying 
HB processes. This is an important contribution that identifies whether individuals with 
high or low cognitive functioning are particularly vulnerable to HB in situations where 
their attention is divided between multiple activities, as is often the case in the real world. 
Finally, we present a novel approach to modeling individual variability in MPT models. 
This contribution is not unique to the HB literature, but rather has applications in the 
MPT literature more broadly. We now discuss each of these contributions in more detail 
and link our findings to implications for older adults real-world functioning. 
Our findings regarding the role of cognitive abilities in the underlying recollection 
and reconstruction processes in older adults are intuitive: In the recollection stage, 
episodic memory is important for recalling a prior prediction. Inhibitory control plays a 
role in recollection as well, particularly when irrelevant outcome information needs to be 
inhibited. More specifically, our finding that cognitive load doubled the typical recollection 
bias effect suggests that inhibitory control is an important contributor to recollection bias. 
In the reconstruction stage, inhibitory control is needed to suppress the CJ so that it 
does not bias the reconstruction of a forgotten prior prediction. We found some variability 
with regard to the role of working memory in these processes, such that higher working 
memory capacity predicted better recollection (Exp. 1) but more biased reconstruction 
(Exp. 2) of prior predictions. We were unable to identify the cognitive predictors of the 
underlying HB processes in younger adults, which was most likely due to less cognitive 
variability in our high functioning sample. 
Our finding that inhibitory control is important in recollection bias supports the 
hypothesis that inhibitory control is needed to suppress outcome knowledge so that it 
does not interfere with recall of the OJ (e.g., Erdfelder et al., 2007). However, it remains 
unclear whether the CJ alters the memory representation of the OJ as postulated by 
immediate outcome assimilation theories (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975; Hoffrage et al., 2000) or 
whether the CJ interferes with the retrieval of an unchanged OJ memory representation 
as postulated by the relative-trace strength theory (e.g., Hell et al., 1988). This question 
is akin to the well-known misinformation effect debate about whether misremembered 
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information is due to new information modifying existing information (see Loftus & Loftus, 
1980) or interfering with access to or retrieval of permanently stored information in long-
term memory (see McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). While some researchers believe that 
it may be impossible to resolve this debate (e.g., Greenwald, 2012; Loftus & Hoffman, 
1989), teasing apart the role of inhibitory control in recollection processes will have 
strong implications for HB and our conception of memory more generally (see Calvillo, 
2014; Pohl & Gawlik, 1995 for how the misinformation effect is related to HB). 
Our finding that inhibitory control is also important in reconstruction bias supports 
the inhibitory-deficit explanation of increased susceptibility to HB in older adults 
advanced by Bayen and colleagues (2006). In Experiment 1, it is unclear whether older 
adults with poorer inhibitory control showed more reconstruction bias due to a deficit in 
the access function of inhibition, suppression function of inhibition, or both. For example, 
older adults with low access inhibition may have had more difficulty with attentional 
control, resulting in the CJ gaining access to working memory. Another possibility is that 
older adults with low suppression inhibition had more difficulty ignoring the CJ 
information once it gained access to working memory. Finally, it is possible that older 
adults with lower inhibitory control exhibited deficits in both access and suppression 
functions. In Experiment 2, in our cognitive load condition, we deliberately asked 
participants to remember the CJ and thus assume (supported by the high RCJ rates) 
that this information gained access to working memory. This suggests that our 
manipulation targeted the suppression function but not the access function of inhibition. 
Given that cognitive load increased reconstruction bias in individuals with higher 
inhibitory control, we conclude that this increase resulted from a deficit in the 
suppression function of inhibition. 
With regard to the interaction between baseline cognitive ability and cognitive 
load on HB performance, our findings suggest that even older adults with higher 
cognitive ability are susceptible to HB, particularly when cognitive resources are limited 
by other competing tasks. In other words, when under cognitive load, higher functioning 
individuals appear to lose their “cognitive advantage” over lower functioning individuals. 
This suggests that higher functioning individuals rely on deliberative cognitive processes 
to complete the memory design task. When these cognitive resources are depleted via a 
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secondary task, higher functioning individuals are no longer able to rely on their effective 
cognitive strategies. Consequently, performance between lower and higher functioning 
individuals is equated. What remains unclear is whether, when under cognitive load, 
higher functioning individuals adopt similar strategies to those utilized by lower 
functioning individuals or whether higher and lower functioning individuals arrive at 
similar levels of task performance in different ways. Jost, Bryck, Vogel, and Mayr (2011) 
examined a similar question regarding whether older adults are like low working memory 
younger adults on an inhibition task. Jost and colleagues equated older and younger 
adults’ working memory resources via additional task demands in the younger group and 
then compared inhibition performance across age groups. Older adults had poorer 
suppression of irrelevant information early in the task, suggesting delayed inhibition 
efficiency, but age differences disappeared in the later stages of the task. These findings 
suggest that equating cognitive resources across age groups may equate overall task 
performance, but not necessarily age differences in the underlying task processes.   
Finally, it is essential to assess for individual differences because important 
variation in task performance may be overlooked when using aggregate-level analyses. 
Although other researchers have acknowledged the importance of assessing individual 
differences and have developed models to make this possible (see section 1.1), our 
approach to incorporating individual differences into MPT models has several 
advantages over these prior approaches. First, our logistic modeling approach is easy to 
implement and thus is accessible to researchers. Prior models have been quite 
statistically complex and require advanced statistic knowledge to implement. This level 
of statistical expertise may not be within the scope of all researchers, thus limiting the 
applicability of the models. Second, our logistic model does not require distributional 
assumptions of the parameters. Prior approaches have been limited to ascribing to such 
assumptions, which can be impractical in many contexts. Finally, our approach can be 
adapted to any experimental paradigm and can incorporate any individual difference 
variable (e.g., demographic, cognitive, psychological, health) into the estimation of the 
model’s core parameters. In sum, we provide researchers with a novel, user-friendly tool 
to assessing individual differences in underlying task performance. Through application 
of our model to the HB paradigm, we demonstrated the importance of modeling inter-
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individual heterogeneity in the HB13 model, particularly for heterogeneous samples such 
as older adults, and provided a template for future researchers to follow. 
10.1.   Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions 
10.1.1. The Implications of Hindsight Bias in Older Adults  
Given the necessity to multi-task in everyday life, our findings suggest that both 
low and high cognitive ability older adults are susceptible to HB in the real world. 
Increased susceptibility to HB in older adults is a prominent concern when we consider 
(1) that individuals over the age of 65 represent an increasing proportion of the world’s 
population (United Nations, 2005), (2) the abundance of complex and potentially risky 
financial, health, housing, and safety decisions encountered in later life (Peters et al., 
2007), and (3) the social trend towards maintaining independent decision-making later in 
life (Peters et al, 2007). Furthermore, researchers have identified older adults as a 
favorite target for scams relying on accepting false “I-told-you” claims (see Jacobs, 
1999). Such scams rely on older adults experiencing embarrassment or guilt over their 
perceived memory failures. Therefore, it will be important to educate older adults on 
cognitive biases and provide them with tools and strategies to minimize its 
consequences. 
Goodwin (2010, p. 7) summarized HB as being “…a stubborn quality of human 
judgment and difficult to eliminate.” Indeed, previous attempts to eliminate HB have 
generally failed (Dehn & Erdfelder, 1998; Hell et al., 1988). Nevertheless, researchers 
have identified some strategies to prevent HB or at least reduce the harmful effects it 
incurs (see Louie, Raban, & Sibley, 2007; Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009 for 
reviews). One strategy is called diversification, which involves “not placing all your eggs 
into one basket” when making high-risk decisions (e.g., financial investments) so that 
when disaster strikes the outcome is less costly. Other strategies involve using “sound 
decision making rules” that have a history of success, keeping emotions in check, and 
resisting over-reliance on short-term information (Louie et al., 2007). Relatedly, 
researchers have highlighted the potential benefits of shifting from System 1 processing, 
which is a fast, automatic, intuitive, and emotion-based processing system, to System 2 
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processing, which is a slower, effortful, analytic-based processing system (Stanovich & 
West, 2000; Milkman et al., 2009). This would require replacing intuition with formal 
logic-based analyses (e.g., weighing various predictors and outcomes). Finally, other 
approaches include seeking advice from others that are not invested in the outcome, 
taking an outsiders perspective, making group rather than individual decisions, and 
holding people accountable for their decisions, all of which reduce overconfidence in 
decision-making (Milkman et al., 2009). 
With regard to HB more specifically, researchers have had some success in 
reducing HB when asking participants to list reasons for making their decision, to think of 
plausible alternative outcomes, and to provide evidence contrary to the outcome (Pezzo 
& Pezzo, 2007; Roese & Vohs, 2012; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977). Furthermore, in the 
decision-making and cognitive aging literature, researchers have shown that strategies 
such as presenting less information (i.e., reducing cognitive load) when making complex 
decisions can effectively increase older adults’ decision-making capabilities (e.g., 
medical decision, Wood et al., 2011). Finally, although there has been limited success in 
reducing HB by educating individuals on the bias (Fischhoff, 1982), developing 
awareness of the bias is essential so that protective mechanisms can be implemented. 
For example, older adults should be educated on (1) the faulty nature of the human 
memory system, (2) common biases that result in misremembering, (3) the limited 
accuracy of prospective judgments, and (4) common scams that play on older adults’ 
perceptions of their memory. Based on the current state of the literature, strategies for 
developing a more realistic appreciation of recall and predictive capacities should be 
processed-oriented rather than performance-oriented to guide adaptive learning and 
reduce overconfidence in decision-making. Until we develop a better understanding of 
HB and a solution to eliminating HB emerges, developing awareness and implementing 
protective mechanisms may be the best guard against HB. 
10.1.2. Limitations and Future Research 
With regard to the role of cognitive abilities in HB, future research is needed to 
disentangle the role of working memory in older adults’ underlying HB processes. Our 
findings indicated that higher work memory capacity improves recall but increases 
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reconstruction bias (and thus HB more generally). Previous studies have also found a 
discrepancy between working memory capacity and HB. This discrepancy may be due to 
the varied ways of measuring HB and the dissociable components of HB. Blank, Nestler, 
von Collani, and Fischer (2008) identified three distinct components of HB: memory 
distortions, impressions of foreseeability, and impressions of inevitability, with the 
memory design task fitting into the memory distortion component. Experimental 
manipulation studies have revealed that the three components often differ in magnitude 
and even direction of bias, are uncorrelated, and involve different underlying processes 
(Blank et al., 2008).  For example, Nestler et al. (2008) found that lower working memory 
capacity was associated with a lower inevitability component of HB, whereas, Calvillo 
(2012) found that lower working memory capacity was associated with higher memory 
distortion component of HB. Thus, the role of working memory capacity may depend on 
what component of HB is being assessed. In addition, our findings suggest that the 
direction of the relationship between working memory capacity and recollection and 
reconstruction processes differ. Thus, future studies should examine the role of working 
memory in the underlying HB processes, rather than on overall HB measures that 
combine and thus confound recollection and reconstruction processes.  
Second, we were unable to identify the cognitive predictors of HB in younger 
adults. Future research should assess the cognitive mechanisms underlying the HB 
processes in younger adults using a more representative sample of the general 
population of younger adults, which would likely increase variation in cognitive 
functioning. Another possibility for future research will be to investigate other individual 
differences variables (e.g., additional cognitive variables or personality factors) that 
might explain heterogeneity in younger adults’ HB processes that were not addressed 
here. Although we were not able to identify the cognitive predictors of HB in younger 
adults, younger adults demonstrated HB, and importantly, they demonstrated significant 
variability in the underlying HB processes. Thus, identifying what factors account for this 
variability would help further the field’s understanding of HB at different stages in the 
lifespan. Relatedly, future research should examine factors contributing to the underlying 
HB processes in middle-aged adults. To the best of our knowledge, no work has 
investigated susceptibility to HB in middle-aged adults. Interestingly, some cognitive 
abilities improve from young to middle adulthood followed by a decline in late adulthood 
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(Kaufman, 2001; Thornton & Dumke, 2005). Researchers have investigated such non-
linear development trajectories of theory of mind (see Bernstein, Thornton, & 
Sommerville, 2011b), a social cognitive ability that is significantly correlated with HB 
(Bernstein, Atance, Meltzoff, & Loftus, 2007), but no work to date has implemented this 
approach in the HB literature. 
Finally, as we increase our understanding of the mechanisms underlying HB at 
different stages in the lifespan, future research should shift towards identifying the 
functional impact of HB. Older adults should be the target of this research given that they 
are a high-risk population, both in terms of their susceptibility to HB but also in terms of 
the negative consequences that HB can have on everyday function. This will encourage 
researchers to go beyond describing age-related changes in HB and move towards 
developing strategies to improve older adults’ judgments in everyday life. While quite a 
few strategies to reducing HB and its consequences have been proposed (see section 
10.1.1), there is little empirical evidence for these strategies. Thus, as our knowledge of 
HB continues to expand, future researchers should test the effectiveness of existing 
strategies as well as develop additional strategies. 
10.2.   Conclusion 
 
In sum, we present a novel approach to modeling individual differences in task 
performance and apply this approach to the HB paradigm. Our findings provide strong 
evidence for the role of inhibitory control in recollection and reconstruction processes in 
older adults, and suggest that the degree to which inhibition influences HB varies with 
available processing resources and task demands. Given the multitude of decisions that 
older adults encounter, it will be important to increase awareness of the overconfidence 
and false sense of security that HB provides as well as implement strategies to acquire a 
more realistic appreciation of our ability to predict future outcomes. 
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Chapter 11.  
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Additional Analyses: Normally Distributed Error Term 
To test whether our results hold when we assume that the error terms of the underlying 
latent variables (e.g., 𝑏𝑘𝑚
∗ ) were normally distributed rather than logistically distributed, 
we re-conducted our primary analyses with older adults and younger adults using an 
ogive link function. We modeled the core parameters (bk, rCk, rEk) as the following ogive 
functions of the cognitive covariates: 
 𝑏𝑘 = ⁡Φ(𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽𝑏1𝑋1𝑘 + 𝛽𝑏2𝑋2𝑘 +⋯+𝛽𝑏𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑘) 
 𝑟𝐶𝑘 = Φ(𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛1𝑋1𝑘 + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛2𝑋2𝑘 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑘)      (A1) 
 𝑟𝐸𝑘 = Φ(𝛼𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝1𝑋1𝑘 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝2𝑋2𝑘 +⋯+𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑘) 
where α and βc, c = 1, …, C, are  parameters to be estimated, Xck, c = 1, …, C, denotes 
the value of participant k on the variable Xc, and ϕ(.) represents the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal distribution. We thus refer to this model as 
the ogive HB13 model with core parameters bk, rCk, rEk. 
Model Evaluation 
Our model evaluation comparing the AIC values and Akaike weights for the ogive HB13 
model against the remaining three candidate models revealed that the ogive HB13 
model was the preferable model in both age groups. In older adults, the rounded AIC 
value for the ogive HB13 model was only slightly worse than the AIC value for the 
logistic HB13 model (AIC logistic HB13 = 12,027; AIC ogive HB13 = 12,029). In younger 
adults, the rounded AIC value for the ogive HB13 model and the logistic HB13 model 
were the same (AIC = 12,412). For both age groups, the probability estimate that the 
ogive HB13 model was the best of our four candidate models was very close to 1. Thus, 
the ogive model and the logistic model provide equally good approximations to our data, 
and both outperform the other three candidate models.   
Older Adult Ogive HB13 Model Tests 
To test whether any of the cognitive variables independently predicted recollection ability 
or reconstruction bias in older adults we bootstrapped the 95% confidence intervals for 
the beta coefficients on each cognitive covariate for each of the core parameters (rCk, rEk, 
and bk) in the ogive HB13 model. As is shown in Table A1, the findings from our logistic 
HB13 model held: Episodic memory was the only significant predictor of rCk, β = 0.03, 
95% CI = [0.01, 0.06], pb < .001; both episodic memory, β = 0.04, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.06], 
pb < .001, and inhibition, β = -0.01, 95% CI = [-0.02, -0.01], pb < .001, were significant 
predictors of rEk; working memory capacity was a marginally significant predictor of rEk, β 
= 0.04, 95% CI = [-0.001, 0.07], pb = .10; and inhibition was the only significant predictor 
of bk, β = 0.03, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.04], pb < .001.   
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Younger Adult Ogive HB13 Model Tests 
To test whether any of the cognitive variables independently predicted recollection ability 
or reconstruction bias in younger adults we bootstrapped the 95% confidence intervals 
for the beta coefficients on each cognitive covariate for each of the core parameters (rCk, 
rEk, and bk) in the ogive HB13 model. As is shown in Table A1, we once again replicated 
the findings from our logistic HB13 model: On the basis of 500 bootstrapped samples, 
the 95% confidence intervals for the beta coefficients revealed that none of the cognitive 
covariates significantly predicted bk, rCk, or rEk.Taken together, these results suggest that 
replacing logistically distributed errors with normally distributed errors does not change 
the substantive conclusions.  
 
Table A1.    Model Tests for the Ogive HB13 Model by Age Group 
Cognitive Function 
Coefficient 
Older             Younger 
pb (two-tailed) 
Older            Younger 
Recollection: Control (rCk)      
αC0  0.86 -0.29   
βC1 (Inhibition)  0.003  0.01   .38 .84 
βC2 (Episodic Memory)  0.03 -0.01 <.001 .35 
βC3 (Working Memory)   0.02    0.004   .32 .71 
Recollection: Experimental(rEk)     
αE0 -0.83 -0.48   
βE1 (Inhibition) -0.01  0.02 <.001 .88 
βE2 (Episodic Memory)  0.04    0.001 <.001 .89 
βE3 (Working Memory)  0.04    0.001   .10 .50 
Reconstruction Bias (bk)     
αb0 -0.92   0.31   
βb1 (Inhibition)  0.03  -0.03 <.001 .21 
βb2 (Episodic Memory) -0.0002  -0.01   .92 .24 
βb3 (Working Memory)  0.05  -0.04   .38 .56 
Note. The p-values (denoted pb) for the cognitive covariate tests are based on 
bootstrapping the 95% confidence intervals for the beta coefficients on each cognitive 
covariate for each of the core parameters. 
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Aggregate Analysis: HB13 Model 
We analyzed the data using the HB13 multinomial model developed by Erdfelder and 
Buchner (1998). To assess model fit, we compared the aggregate HB13 model against 
the general multinomial model for 2 · 10 data categories using parametric bootstrapping. 
In accordance with prior work (e.g., Bayen et al., 2006) we set an alpha-level of .01 for 
the model fit test because we did not want to reject a model that only slightly differed 
from the comparison model.The model evaluation was based on 6040 data points (122 
participants · 50 items – 60 missing responses). Power analysis indicated that we had 
high power (.99) to detect even small deviations (w = .1, Cohen, 1988) from the general 
multinomial model. On the basis of 500 bootstrapped samples, we found an acceptable 
model fit, G2(10) = 31.27, pb = .01. 
Table B1 presents the results of the parameter tests across age groups, and Table B2 
reports the parameter estimates and their standard errors by age group.  We used the 
conventional alpha-level of .05 to test for statistical differences in the parameters. As 
expected, on the basis of 500 bootstrapped samples, our analysis revealed significant 
age differences in overall recollection ability – that is, parameters rC and rE. In 
comparison to younger adults, older adults had lower recollection of the OJ for both 
control and experimental items. Furthermore, older but not younger adults demonstrated 
a significant recollection bias, defined as lower recollection of the OJs for experimental 
as compared to control items. Descriptively, the recollection bias was slightly higher in 
older adults (.04) than in younger adults (.03). Bayen et al. (2006) also observed a 
recollection bias for both younger and older adults, but this bias was not statistically 
significant for younger adults and fell short of statistical significance for older adults. 
Perhaps our significant recollection bias finding in older adults was due to our relatively 
large sample of 62 younger and 60 older adults, which was more than double the 
sample of Bayen et al. (26 younger and 26 older adults). 
Older adults demonstrated higher reconstruction bias than younger adults; however, this 
difference did not reach statistical significance (pb = .23). Although Bayen et al. (2006) 
found a significant age difference in reconstruction bias, this difference did not reach 
statistical significance in Bernstein et al. (2011, p = .18). Nevertheless, in all three 
studies, there was at least a descriptive trend towards older adults demonstrating higher 
reconstruction bias than did younger adults. Finally, we observed a significant age 
difference in parameter c, with older adults demonstrating significantly more CJ 
adoptions than younger adults. This is consistent with Bayen et al.’s (2006, Exp. 2) 
finding of increased CJ adoptions when the CJ is accessible during ROJ.  Overall, our 
findings of age differences in the core HB parameters are generally consistent with those 
of prior work. 
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Table B1.    Parameter Tests Using the Aggregate HB13 Model 
Null hypothesis ΔG2 pb df 
Across-age group tests 
rC constant across age groups 45.31 <.001 1 
rE constant across age groups 59.71 <.001 1 
b constant across age groups  1.37 .23 1 
c constant across age groups  5.04 <.001 1 
Within age group tests: Younger adults 
rC = rE  2.77 .11 1 
b = 0 56.24 <.001 4 
Within age group tests: Older adults 
rC = rE  6.68  .001 1 
b = 0 76.08 <.001 4 
Note. The p-values (denoted pb) are based on 500 bootstrapped samples. rC = 
probability of recalling the original judgment (OJ) for control items; rE = probability of 
recalling the OJ for experimental items; b = probability of reconstruction bias.  
 
Table B2.     HB13 Model Parameter Estimates (and Standard Errors) by Age Group 
Parameter 
Parameter Estimate (Standard Error) 
      Older                              Younger 
rC                                .25 (.01)                       .36 (.01) 
rE                                .21 (.01)                       .33 (.01) 
rC- rE                                .04                                .03 
b                                .42 (.04)                       .35 (.04) 
c                                .01 (.01)                     <.001 (.01) 
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List of Questions (and Correct Answers in Metric Units) 
Used in Experiment 1 of the Memory Judgment Task 
1. At what temperature does copper melt? (2,415 Celsius) 
2. How high is the Statue of Liberty including its base? (93 metres)  
3. What year did the mutiny on the Bounty occur? (1790) 
4. What is the distance between New York and Los Angeles (by road)? 
(4,546kilometres) 
5. In what year was the monkey wrench invented? (1841) 
6. In what year was the harmonica invented? (1821) 
7. How long is the Rhine River? (1,320 kilometres) 
8. What year did the Hundred Years’ War begin? (1339)  
9. What year was the lightning rod invented? (1752) 
10. How long is the Great Wall of China? (3,460 kilometres) 
11. What year were X-rays discovered? (1895) 
12. At what speed must wind blow to be classified as a Moderate Gale Force? (51 
kilometres per hour) 
13. What is the average depth of the Pacific Ocean? (3,940 metres) 
*14. At what temperature does tin melt? (2,930 Celsius) 
15. On average, how many days is a female elephant pregnancy? (631 days)  
16. How long is the Amazon River? (6,556 kilometres) 
17. How long is the Mississippi River? (3,779 kilometres) 
18. What year did William Herschel discover the planet Uranus? (1781) 
19. In what year was Jane Austin’s Pride and Prejudice first published? (1813) 
20. What is the average temperature of the Antarctic winter? (-68 Celsius) 
21. What is the highest temperature ever measured on Earth? (57 Celsius) 
22. What percentage of the world’s population was under the age of five in 1995? (7.7%) 
23. What year was Leonardo da Vinci born? (1452) 
24. How long is the world’s longest bridge? (38.42 kilometres) 
25. What year did Sir James Dewar, an English chemist, invent the thermos flask? 
(1873) 
26. When was the first reflecting telescope developed? (1671) 
27. How many carats is the world’s largest reported diamond? (3,106 carats) 
*28. What is the official land speed record for a land vehicle? (1,019 kilometres per hour) 
29. How many days does the planet Mercury take to make one trip around the sun? (88 
days) 
30. How long is an international nautical mile? (1,852 metres) 
31. What percentage of the world’s population lived in Africa in 1994? (12.4%) 
32. How many plays did William Shakespeare write? (37 plays) 
33. When travelling 97 kilometers per hour in a car, how much room should you allow 
yourself to brake? (83 metres) 
34. What is the distance between Tokyo and Chicago (by air)? (10,137 kilometres) 
35. What year was the parking meter invented? (1935) 
36. What year was radiotelegraphy invented? (1899) 
37. What year did Leonardo da Vinci create Mona Lisa? (1503)  
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*38. In what year was Harvard University founded? (1686) 
39. What year did Franz Joseph I, the emperor of Austria, die? (1916)  
40. What year did Albert Einstein formulate the theory of relativity? (1903) 
41. What is the diameter of the planet Mars? (6,787 kilometres) 
42. How high is the highest point on Mount Kilimanjaro? (5,895 metres) 
43. What year were the first modern-day Olympic games celebrated? (1896)  
44. What percentage of the world’s population lived in Europe in 1994? (9%) 
45. How many muscles does the human body have? (639 muscles) 
46. What percentage of the human body is composed of nitrogen? (8.5%) 
47. What year was the first mailbox invented? (1653) 
48. When was slavery officially abolished in the United States? (1865)  
49. How many films did Alfred Hitchcock direct? (56 films) 
50. In what year was William Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of King Lear first published? 
(1608) 
51. In what year was Socrates born? (470 BC) 
52. In what year was Daniel Defoe’s “Robinson Crusoe” first published? (1719) 
53. What year was the mechanical loom invented? (1785) 
54. How many detective books did Agatha Christie write? (67 books)  
 
*Note: The items marked by an asterisk were excluded from the analyses because they 
violated the model’s symmetry assumption. 
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Aggregate Analysis: HB19 Model 
We applied the HB19 multinomial model with data aggregated across individuals to 
obtain the aggregate core parameter estimates and to compare these estimates across 
experimental conditions. To assess model fit, we compared the aggregate HB19 model 
against the general multinomial model for 3 · 10 data categories using parametric 
bootstrapping. In accordance with prior work (e.g., Bayen et al., 2006) we set an alpha-
level of .01 for the model fit test because we did not want to reject a model that only 
slightly differed from the comparison model.  The model evaluation was based on 4,510 
data points (80 participants · 57 items – 50 missing responses). Power analysis 
indicated that we had high power (.99) to detect even small deviations (w = .1, Cohen, 
1988) from the general multinomial model.  Based on 500 bootstrapped samples, we 
found an acceptable model fit, G2(8) = 19.16, pb = .03. 
Table D1 reports the parameter estimates and Table D2 reports the results of the 
parameter tests across experimental conditions. We used the conventional alpha-level of 
.05 to test for statistical differences in the parameters. As expected, based on 500 
bootstrapped samples, our analysis revealed a significant recollection bias in both 
experimental conditions, defined as lower recollection of the OJ for experimental 
compared to control items. As expected, recollection of the OJ for experimental items 
was significantly lower in the cognitive load condition (.21) than in the standard 
experimental condition (.23), resulting in a higher recollection bias in the former 
condition. We also found a significant reconstruction bias in both experimental 
conditions. While reconstruction bias was descriptively higher in the cognitive load 
condition (.50) compared to the standard experimental condition (.44), this difference did 
not reach significance (pb = .21). Finally, our analyses revealed that CJ adoptions were 
significantly greater than 0 in the cognitive load condition, but not in the standard 
experimental condition. Taken together, these findings are consistent with those from 
Experiment 1 and with Bayen et al. (2006) who also observed a marginally significant 
recollection bias and a significant reconstruction bias in older adults. Our finding of 
increased CJ adoptions in the cognitive load condition is also consistent with Bayen et 
al.’s (2006, Exp. 2) finding that older adults exhibited significantly larger CJ adoptions 
when the CJs were in working memory rather than physically present during ROJ.  
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Table D1.    HB19 Model Parameter Estimates  
Parameter Control          Standard Experimental        Cognitive Load 
rC    .27   
rE  .23 .21 
rC - rE  .04 .06 
b  .44 .50 
c  .007 .08 
 
Table D2.    Parameter Tests Using the Aggregate HB13 Model 
Null hypothesis ΔG2 pb df 
Across Condition Tests 
rES = rEL 27.91 <.001 1 
bS= bL  1.76 .21 1 
cS= cL 49.43 <.001 1 
Within Condition Tests: Standard Experimental Condition 
rC = rES  5.02 .02 1 
bS = 0 85.85 <.001 4 
cS= 0  0.01 .46 1 
Within Condition Tests: Cognitive Load Condition 
rC = rEL 15.53 <.001 1 
bL = 0 132.31 <.001 4 
cL= 0  62.92 <.001 1 
Note. The p-values (denoted pb) are based on 500 bootstrapped samples.  rC = 
probability of recalling the original judgment (OJ) for control items; rE = probability of 
recalling the OJ for experimental items; rC – rE = estimated recollection bias; b = 
probability of reconstruction bias.  
